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This thesis identifies and explains the critical changes that have occurred in the 
complex system of interrelated rules which have governed the defense budget process in 
Poland since 1989. This research explains the legal and institutional evolution of the 
defense budget process in post-communist Poland, focusing on the role of legislative 
authority i.e., the Sejm and the Senat of the Republic of Poland within the defense budget 
process since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. It also analyzes the distribution of power 
among the different actors in the budget cycle. This is followed by a thorough description 
of rules imposed by the Law on Restructuring, Technical Modernization and Financing 
of the Polish Armed Forces in the Years 2001-2006, and the Act of Equipping the Armed 
Forces of the Republic of Poland with Multi-Role Aircraft. These two documents were 
instrumental in shaping defense spending in Poland in the years 2001-2003 and will have 
a great impact on future decisions concerning defense budgets in the years to come. An 
overview of defense spending by European members of NATO is also provided to allow 
a comparison of Poland’s willingness to commit resources to the common defense of 
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The government’s inability to forestall Poland’s economic decline led to waves of 
strikes across the country in April, May, and August 1988, and finally caused the collapse 
of communism in Poland in 1989. In December of that year, the lower house of 
Parliament (the Sejm) approved the government’s plan to transform the Polish economy 
rapidly from centrally planned to free-market, and renamed the country the Republic of 
Poland.   
Sixteen years of the democratic transformation in Poland provides a 
comprehensive as well as incisive overview of the extraordinarily difficult and 
historically unprecedented process of transforming a totalitarian system into a modern 
democracy. That transition has been characterized by frequent changes in government 
and instability, reflected by a diversity of political interests in the Sejm. It has been 
extremely difficult to reach consensus in approving budgets. 
In 2003, for the first time in 15 years, the budget law came into life from the 
beginning of the year for which it had been passed. Having signed the 2003 Budget Law, 
President Aleksander Kwasniewski said,  
The ceremony of signing the budget law has a special significance. For the 
fist time in the history of the Third Republic of Poland a budget for the 
next year has been signed before the end of the current year. This can be 
understood as a present for the Polish democratic system. The budget is 
one of the important foundations of a democratic state.1  
This thesis will identify and explain the critical changes that have occurred in the 
complex system of interrelated rules, which have governed the defense budget process in  
                                                 
1 Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Washington D.C.. “President Signs 2003 Budget Law.” Dec 




Poland since 1989. It will analyze the distribution of power among the different actors in 
the budget cycle, focusing on the role of the legislature in the control of defense 
spending. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The intent of this research is to explain the legal and institutional evolution of the 
defense budget process in post-communist Poland, focusing on the role of legislative 
authority, i.e., the Sejm and the Senate of the Republic of Poland within the defense 
budget process since the collapse of communism. It will identify the changes to the basic 
rules governing the budget process and explain how these changes impacted the Polish 
Parliament. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION  
The primary research question to be addressed in this thesis is: What were the 
major changes impacting the process of governmental budgeting for defense in Poland 
after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact? 
Subsidiary research questions include the following:  
• What were the original processes for governmental defense 
budgeting when Poland replaced a communist government and a 
command economy with democracy and free markets?  
• What major changes were made to these processes just after 1989, 
and why? 
• What processes and structures were put in place by the Little 
Constitution in 1992? 
• What changes were made by the 1997 Constitution and why were 
they made?  
• What is the significance of the Public Finance Act of 26 November 
1998? 
• What were the implications for governmental defense budgeting of 
Poland’s acceptance into NATO in 1999? 
• What was the origin and impact of the Law on Restructuring, 
Technical Modernization and Financing of the Polish Armed 
Forces in the years 2001 – 2006? 
• What problems have been observed in implementing the Law on 
Restructuring, Technical Modernization and Financing of the 
Polish Armed Forces? 
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• What is the structure of the defense budget associated with the 
standards of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? 
• What is the role of the legislature during the different stages of the 
budget process? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will utilize an historical perspective to identify the key changes in 
legislative authority and action concerning defense budget processes. Data obtained from 
parliamentary hearings and legislation as well as scholarly journals will be used to 
identify the legal and structural changes in the role of the legislature in the control of 
defense spending in Poland.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The first chapter explains why the thesis is being written. The first section of this 
chapter briefly describes problems associated with the legal and institutional evolution of 
defense budgets in post-communist Poland, followed by the list of research questions to 
be addressed in this thesis and a description of the methodology to be used to develop 
answers.   
The second chapter describes the legal and institutional evolution of the defense 
budget process in post-communist Poland between 1989 and 1993. To provide a 
comprehensive picture of the distribution of power among the different actors in the 
budget cycle and the role of the legislature in the control of defense spending, Chapter II 
is subdivided into three main parts. The first part provides an overview of the political 
environment and institutional reforms that occurred between 1989 and 1993. The second 
part describes the reforms of the Polish Armed Forces that occurred during this period, 
while the third part focuses on the role of legislative authority within the defense budget 
process and its evolution.  
The third chapter is a continuation of Chapter II and has the same structure. 
Chapter III provides a chronological description of democratic transformation, followed 
by an analysis of the rules that governed the process of budgeting for defense between 
1993 and 2003.  
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The fourth chapter presents and analyzes the process of developing defense 
budgets in Poland in the years 2003 and 2004. The first section of this chapter provides 
an overview of the contemporary governmental system. The second section focuses on 
defense budgetary procedures by level of development. Three subsections comprise this 
part. The first describes the creation of the defense budget in the Ministry of National 
Defense (MoND), the second depicts the parliament’s activities, and the third subsection 
describes the options given to the President. The last section of this chapter analyzes the 
process of control over the execution of the defense budget. 
The fifth chapter provides a detailed description of rules imposed by the Law on 
Restructuring, Technical Modernization and Financing of the Polish Armed Forces in the 
years 2001-2006, and the Act of Equipping the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland 
with Multi-Role Aircraft. The last part of this chapter displays Poland’s defense 
expenditures in comparison with the other European states of NATO. 
Finally, the sixth chapter provides the overall picture of the budget process in 
Poland followed by the author’s observations and conclusions, and recommendations for 
further research.  
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II. LEGAL AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES BETWEEN 1989 AND 
THE LITTLE CONSTITUTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To fully understand the legal and institutional evolution of the defense budget 
process in post-communist Poland, an overview of the political environment, institutional 
reforms, and the structure of the armed forces over the course of history is appropriate. 
This chapter outlines the reforms that occurred between 1989 and 1993, followed by an 
analysis of the rules that governed the defense budget in that time frame.    
B.  POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 
In October 1981, General Jaruzelski was elected to the post of Prime Secretary of 
Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR). Less than two months later (13 December 1981) 
he introduced marshal law in reaction to the escalating civil protest.2  These events 
created a unique situation. General Jaruzelski kept all powers in his hands, being not only 
the party leader and the head of the government, but also the Minister of Defense and the 
Chairman of the National Defense Committee (KOK).3 Martial law was suspended at the 
end of December 1982 and formally ended on 22 July 1983.4 However, the Jaruzelski 
regime failed to resolve critical economic problems. On the contrary, the economic 
situation became worse than ever because the United States and other Western countries 
responded to martial law by imposing economic sanctions against the Polish regime. The 
government’s inability to forestall Poland’s economic decline led to waves of strikes 
across the country in April, May, and August 1988.  
In an attempt to gain control over the situation, the government gave recognition 
to Solidarity, and the eighth PZPR plenum appointed the Minister of Interior, General 
                                                 
2 Roszkowski, Waldemar. Polwiecze. Historia polityczna swiata po 1945 roku. Warszawa, 2002, pp. 
336-338. 
3 Madej, Marek. “Evolution of Democratic Civilian Control of Armed Forces in Poland: An 
Overview.” Conference Paper at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 
Geneva. January 2004, p. 4. 
4 Sanford, George. Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics Since 1989, N.Y.: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 38. 
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Czeslaw Kiszczak, to talk with the opposition.5 As a result, Round Table talks began on 6 
February 1989. The agreement reached on 5 April was a package of carefully negotiated 
compromises based on the principle of gradualism rather than on the commitment to 
transform the system into democracy. The main decisions were as follows:6 
• To restore a 100 member Senate, to be filled by completely free 
elections. 
• To hold “contractual” Sejm elections in which the PZPR would 
contest and win just under half the seats, while the United Peasant 
Party (ZSL), Democratic Party (SD) and Catholic minor parties 
would hold the remainder up to the 65 percent granted to the 
Government-Coalition side.  
• The Solidarity-Opposition would be allowed to contest 35 percent 
of the Sejm seats. 
• Unfettered parliamentary elections would take place in four years. 
The Round Table “set in motion a domino process that within a year led to the fall 
of all the communist regimes in Eastern Europe.”7 In August 1989, President Jaruzelski 
asked Tadeusz Mazowiecki to form a government. Then, on September 12, the Sejm 
approved his cabinet and for the first time in more than 40 years, Poland had a 
government led by noncommunists. In December 1989, the Sejm approved the 
government’s reform program to transform the Polish economy from central planning to 
a free market. In November 1990, Lech Walesa was elected President of the Republic of 
Poland. Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, at Walensa’s request, formed a government and served as 
its Prime Minister until October 1991, when the first free parliamentary elections were 
held.  
                                                 
5 Solidarity formally was founded on 22 September 1980, when delegates of 36 regional trade unions 
met in Gdansk and united under the name Solidarnosc. By early 1981, Solidarity had a membership of 
approximately 10 million people and represented most of the work force of Poland. On 13 December 1981, 
Solidarity was declared illegal by Jaruzelski, and its leaders were arrested. The union was formally 
dissolved by the Sejm (Parliament) on 8 October 1982, but it nevertheless continued as an underground 
organization.  Encyclopedia Britannica. 1997. Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.britannica.com/nobel/micro/555_63.html  (27 May 2004). 
6 Sanford, George. Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics Since 1989, N.Y.: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 54. 
7 Elster, Jon, Offe, Claus, and Preuss, Ulrich. Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies, 
Rebuilding the Ship at Sea. Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 65. 
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The absence of constitutional reforms in the first years after the fall of 
communism created instability and inefficiency in the execution of executive power. For 
example, J. K. Bielecki’s cabinet could not receive support for any of its crucial projects 
because the Constitution of 1952 did not authorize the Government to lay down decrees 
with the force of law. “The Government had no support from the Parliament and no legal 
instruments to execute its own program like a law to lay down decrees valid like statutes 
or preferences for the government legislative initiatives.”8  
Moreover, when the Polish people went to cast their votes in the parliamentary 
elections of October 1991, they had to choose from 111 political parties and 
organizations that appointed 6,980 candidates for the 460 Sejm seats. As a result, 29 
parties gained seats in the Sejm.9 
About 43 percent of the electorate turned out to vote on 27 October 1991 for the 
first totally free parliamentary elections in postwar Poland.10 They elected the most 
diverse parliament in the country’s history: (See Figures 1 and 2) 
• The Democratic Union (UD), headed by former Prime Minister 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, received 62 seats (13.48 percent) in the 
Sejm and 21 seats of 100 available in the Senat. Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD), an alliance of post-communist parties, won 60 
seats (13.04 percent) in the Sejm and four in the Senat. 
• The Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN) received 51 
seats (11.09 percent) in the Sejm and four in the Senat. 
• Polish Peasants Party (PSL) obtained 50 seats (10.87 percent) in 
the Sejm and nine in the Senat. 
• The Catholic Action for Elections (WAK) won 50 seats (10.87 
percent) in the Sejm and nine in the Senat. 
                                                 
8 Ujazdowski, Kazimierz. “The Constitutional and Political Position of the Executive Power in Poland 
after 1989.” 1997. Online. Internet. Available http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/95-97/ujazdow.pdf  (4 
January 2004). 
9 Mair, Peter, and Morlino, Leonardo. “In Search of Democratic Governance in Post-Communist 
Poland. An Institutional Perspective.” April 2000. Online. Internet. Available 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/copenhagen/ws1/chan.PDF  (1 March 
2004). 
10 Jabloniski, Jaroslaw. The Key Role of NATO Accession on Poland’s Democratic Transformation, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, 2002, p. 33. 
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• The Centrum Alliance (PC) received 44 seats (9.57 percent) in the 
Sejm and nine in the Senat.  
• The Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) obtained 37 seats (8.04 
percent) in the Sejm and 6 in the Senat. 
The next 21 parties each managed to win less than 8 percent of the seats in the 
Sejm, including Solidarity (NSZZ “Solidarnosc”), which won 27 seats (5.87 percent) in 









































Figure 2.   Senat Election Results October 27, 1991 
                                                 
11 Dudek, Antoni. 1991. “Pierwsze wolne wybory parlamentarne 1991. Online. Internet. Available 
http://wybory2001.interia.pl/historia/1991  (30 March 2004). 
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As a result of the diversity reflected in this distribution of power in the 
Parliament, it was impossible to build a stable government majority. Even the most 
successful party, the post-Solidarity UD, won only 13.48 percent of the vote. For 
example, Prime Minister H. Suchocka, in order to form a government majority, created a 
coalition of seven parties. However, the leaders of these parties were not directly 
involved in the government structures. This fact caused a division of the real authority 
between the Cabinet and the party leaders.  
In November 1992, the Little Constitution (Constitutional Law on the 
Relationships between the Legislature and Executive Powers of the Republic of Poland) 
was signed by the President. The main purpose of this constitution “was to eliminate 
existing constitutional law and establish a legal basis for more effective governance.”12 
The constitutional position of the Government was strengthened by the addition of the 
following powers:13 
• To lay down decrees valid like statutes. 
• To assert the execution of statutes. 
• To lead, control, and coordinate the activity of all of the organs of 
State Administration.  
• To protect the interests of the State Treasury. 
• To control the territorial autonomy. 
However, the adoption of the so-called Little Constitution did not markedly 
improve the situation. This constitution was a heavily amended version of the previous 
communist one and was created as a transitional document until a new constitution would 
be adopted. For example, in May 1993, the Sejm dismissed the Suchocka government by 
223 votes to 198, with 24 abstentions.14 Under the Little Constitution, if the Sejm has 
                                                 
12 Jabloniski, Jaroslaw. The Key Role of NATO Accession on Poland’s Democratic Transformation, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, 2002, p. 43. 
13 Ujazdowski, Kazimierz. “The Constitutional and Political Position of the Executive Power in 
Poland after 1989.” 1997. Online. Internet. Available http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/95-97/ujazdow.pdf   
(4 January 2004). 
14 Mair, Peter and Morlino, Leonardo. “In Search of Democratic Governance in Post-Communist 
Poland. An Institutional Perspective.” April 2000. Online. Internet. Available 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/copenhagen/ws1/chan.PDF  (1 March 
2004). 
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passed a vote of no confidence, without, at the same time, choosing a new Prime 
Minister, the President must accept the resignation of the Government or dissolve the 
Sejm. Walensa decided to dissolve Parliament, leaving the country without a legislative 
body for the next three months. (The next Parliament was chosen 19 September 1993). 
Between June 1989 and May 1993 four coalitions and six premiers governed 
Poland. Each government lasted for less than 12 months. In May 1993, Poland’s first 
democratically elected Parliament was dissolved after 18 months of bitter political 
struggles.  
C.  THE REFORM OF THE ARMED FORCES  
Under Poland’s communist regimes, the Politburo (chief decision-making 
committee) of the Polish United Worker’s Party (PZPR) was responsible for almost every 
decision. Thus, the Armed Forces were closely supervised and monitored by PZPR’s 
Central Committee. In addition, the defense ministry was effectively answerable to the 
Soviet armed forces. That is why the minister of national defense, who was supreme 
commander of the army and chief of operations, was always a general officer and a full 
member of the Politburo. 
In other words, the Polish People’s Army was an instrument of Soviet security 
policy. The size of military manpower was closely related to the role that the Polish 
People’s Army played in the security of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, in 1988, the Polish 
armed forces numbered over 897,000 (406,000 active, 491,000 reserves).15  
At that time, party affiliation within the military was extensive. Membership in 
PZPR was mandatory for senior officers and constituted an informal but necessary 
condition of a successful career.16 As a result, 92 percent of officers, 66 percent of 
warrant officers, and 40 percent of professional non-commissioned officers belonged to 
PZPR.17 
                                                 
15 “Armed Services.” October 1992. Online. Internet. Available http://reference.allrefer.com/country-
guide-study/poland/poland256.html  (20 March 2004). 
16 Madej, Marek. “Evolution of Democratic Civilian Control of Armed Forces in Poland: An 
Overview.” Conference Paper at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 
Geneva. January 2004, p. 4. 
17 T. Mitek, “An Army Without Commanders.” Polska Zbrojna. 4-6 September 1992. 
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The rapid collapse of communism in Poland in 1989 required immediate and 
significant changes within the Polish Armed Forces. The first noncommunist Prime 
Minister of Poland, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, declared on 24 August 1989, 
We are not planning to create a new army or militia. Our only aim is to 
establish a kind of legal guarantee which ensures that everyone inside 
these institutions has a sense of being a servant of the society.18 
First of all, the Army was depoliticized with the abolition of PZPR cells and 
control mechanisms. The most independent and potentially dangerous elements of 
communist influence in the armed forces, such as the Internal Military Service and the 2nd 
Department of the General Staff, were disbanded. Moreover,  
under the amended law on professional military service from 1970, the 
prohibition of belonging to any political party, association or even trade 
union was introduced. A service man on active duty could not (and still 
cannot) also be a member of the national or local parliaments and similar 
public institutions, although the law allowed him to stand for election.19  
In 1989, some 68 military units were disbanded, and another 147 units were 
reorganized. According to reports, “this meant the retirement of 400 tanks, 700 artillery 
pieces, 600 armored personnel carriers, and 80 aircraft, as well as a cut of 30,000 active-
duty personnel.”20 Reform measures taken by the end of 1990 included further budget 
and manpower reductions, conversion of 30 military installations to civilian use, 
shortened terms of service for draftees, and freedom of religious practice in the 
military.21 
In the early 1990’s, Poland’s chief military goal was to end the Warsaw Pact 
obligations and to remove the Soviet troops still stationed in Poland, and then quickly 
establish a new set of national security agreements. Poland decided to found its new 
security policy based on three pillars:  
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 5. 
19 Ibid., p. 6. 
20  “Armed Services.” Oct 1992. Online. Internet. Available http://reference.allrefer.com/country-
guide-study/poland/poland256.html  (20 March 2004). 
21 Ibid. 
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• Development of good-neighborly relations and regional 
cooperation in Central Europe. 
• Participation in all-European cooperative arrangements, and 
support for the UN global system of security.  
• Integration with the West European and Euro-Atlantic security 
structure-NATO, the Western European Union, and the European 
Union.22 
The Soviet troop issue was finally resolved in late 1991 with a Soviet agreement 
to remove all combat troops from Poland by the end of 1992 and all support troops by the 
end of 1993.23  
In December 1991 an amendment to the 1967 Law on Duty and Defend the 
Republic of Poland established a system for controlling the armed forces. According to 
this law, the President became “Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces” with 
authority to determine the main directions of development, whereas the Ministry of 
National Defense was converted into a civilian organ of state administration with a 
separate, subordinate armed forces section. Jan Parys was appointed as the first civilian 
Defense Minister.  
In November 1992, two doctrinal documents, The Tenets of Polish Security 
Policy and The Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland, laid out 
the new purposes and tasks of the Polish armed forces. The Security and Defense 
Strategy document made clear that the main role of the armed forces 
is to uphold the nation’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial 
inviolability. Although indicating that Poland faced no immediate major 
threat, the document articulated the long-term aim of insuring against 
future contingencies by seeking membership in NATO.24  
Therefore, the participation in Partnership for Peace (PfP), the program leading to 
membership in NATO, became one of the main priorities for the Polish security policy.  
                                                 
22 Bogowicz, Artur. Polish Armed Force of 2000: Demands and Changes, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey California, 2000, p. 73. 
23 “Transition and Reform.” Oct 1992. Online. Internet. Available 
http://refercnce.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/poland/poland242.html  (19 March 2004). 
24 Cottey, Andrew, Edmunds, Timothy, and Forster, Anthony. Democratic Control of the Military in 
Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards, NY.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 23. 
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In the same year (1992), the Little Constitution was promulgated. On the one 
hand, the Little Constitution gave the President extended competencies. Article 34 of the 
Constitutional Law on the Relationships between the Legislature and Executive Powers 
of the Republic of Poland gave the President general authority over the internal and 
external security of the state. Article 35 strengthened the President’s position as 
Commander of the Armed Forces by giving him authority to appoint, after consultation 
with the Defense Minister, the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff and the 
heads of the main services and military districts. “The president also had the right of 
declaring martial law and mobilization (art. 36) or a state of emergency (art. 37) as well 
as supervising international affairs and ratifying treaties (art 28, 32 and 33).”25 
On the other hand, the President’s power was limited by the Little Constitution. It 
specified that peacetime command of the Polish armed forces was to be exercised by the 
President, the Premier and the Council of Ministers. Namely, the President had the right 
to appoint a Minister of National Defense after consultation and countersignature of the 
Prime Minister. Moreover, the Council of Ministers was in charge of directing internal 
and external policy of the Republic of Poland and was responsible for assuring national 
security and conducting state policy on that matter, whereas the Sejm was responsible for 
assigning appropriate levels of annual funding and controlling the execution of adopted 
arrangements.26 This situation caused “the emergence of some kind of ‘two head 
executive,’ when two state organs claimed to have similar competencies.”27 This resulted 
in disputes between the President and the Government over the question of control over 
the armed forces and finally caused the so-called “Drawsko affair” that took place on 30 
September 1994 (see Chapter III).  
 
 
                                                 
25 Sanford, George. Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics Since 1989, N.Y.: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 83. 
26 Smith, Larry. “Poland: Command and Control Doctrine.” September 2002. Online. Internet. 
Available http://orbat.com/site/orbats/data/poland/c2doctrine.html  (16 February 2004). 
27 Madej, Marek. “Evolution of Democratic Civilian Control of Armed Forces in Poland: An 
Overview.” Conference Paper at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 
Geneva. January 2004, p. 8. 
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D.  EVOLUTION OF DEFENSE BUDGET AUTHORITY 
Under communist rule, legislative power was assigned to the Council of State, 
with only the Sejm relegated to formally approving Council decisions once they were 
made. However, security, defense and military policy was the exclusive domain of the 
military, closely controlled by the Main Political Administration. “The majority of 
matters connected with the military (planning, budget, staff, infrastructure) were treated 
as solely ‘army business’ and considered to be confidential or secret.”28 Procedures for 
the planning and realization of expenditures for the purposes of defense were politically 
oriented. Defense budgets were driven mainly by task requirements and did not reflect 
economic situations. 
However, the planning and budgeting system of the Polish People’s Army itself 
was well developed with interrelated phases. The planning horizon was grouped into 
three categories: long-term perspective plans (15 years), medium-term perspective plans 
(five years), and annual budgets. Moreover, planning was consistent with the state 
strategic and administrative assumptions. Furthermore, defense budgetary procedures that 
occurred simultaneously at different organizational (strategic) levels of MoND were 
subordinated to guidelines from the General Staff.29 
After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the military budget could no longer be 
perceived as “army business.” On the contrary, civilian control over the armed forces and 
the defense budget became crucial issues associated with the transition to a democratic 
Poland. This process began when two civilian deputy ministers were included within a 
structure of the MoND in April 1990. Subsequently, the Sejm took back from “the 
militaries” its constitutional obligation and became responsible for assigning appropriate 
levels of annual funding and for passing laws regulating defense.  
 
                                                 
28 Ibid., p. 4. 
29 Palak, Jerzy and Telep, Jerzy. Kierunek Armia Zawodowa? – aspekty ekonomiczne przebudowy I 
modrnizacji Sil Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Belona, 2002, pp. 58-
62. 
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However, at that time, “an overwhelming majority of the deputies elected to the 
Polish parliament were newcomers for whom the budget process was completely 
unknown.”30 The parliamentary budget services that were set up in order to provide 
support to deputies working on the budget consisted of only six employees.31 Moreover, 
“the presence of a multitude of political parties and a wide range of diversity of interests 
in the Polish Sejm, which manifested itself in its entirety during the work on the central 
budget (Deputies frequently identified their own individual or group interest with the 
public interest),” resulted in a very difficult process of budget approval.32  
Moreover, priority of economic reforms over military issues (in 1990, inflation 
was almost 600 percent) caused severe defense budget cuts.33 Between 1989 and 1993 
the defense budget decreased around 60 percent.34 “In 1991, for example, the Ministry of 
National Defense proposed to the Sejm a defense budget of 29 trillion zloty whereas the 
Sejm approved a budget of 23 trillion zloty, but subsequent cuts lowered the total to 16 
trillion zloty.”35 This situation caused the MoND to give up planning process for periods 
longer than one year.   
E.  CONCLUSION 
The democratic transformation of Poland between 1989 and 1993 was 
characterized by frequent changes in government and instability within the political party 
systems. An immense amount of legislative work was done in order to adjust the 
constitutional law to the political and economic changes taking place in Poland. For 
example, the parliament elected in June 1989 drafted more than 200 laws during two 
                                                 
30 Stankiewicz, Wieslaw. “Budget Analysis for Parliaments: The Case of Poland.” 68th IFLA Council 
and General Conference. 18-24 August 2002. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 “Background Notes: Poland.” 2004. Online. Internet. Available 
http://realadventures.com/listing/1024167.htm  (4 February 2004). 
34 Palak, Roman and Telep, Jerzy. Kierunek Armia Zawodowa? – aspekty ekonomiczne przebudowy i 
modrnizacji Sil Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Belona, 2002, p. 16. 
35 “Poland –Military Budget.” October 1992. Online. Internet. Available 
http://www.exploitz.com/Poland-Military-budget-cg.php  (4 January 2004). 
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years of its cadency.36  However, for the Polish Armed Forces, it was a difficult period 
resulting in a gradual degradation of their military capabilities due to sufficient cuts in 
defense spending.  
                                                 
36 “Legislative Initiatives of the Senate of the First and Second Term.” September 1997. Online. 
Internet. Available http://www.senat.gov.pl/k5eng/historia/noty/nota09a.htm  (27 January 2004). 
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III. LEGAL AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES BETWEEN 1993 AND 
2003 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter has a similar structure to the previous one. Namely, it provides a 
chronological description of the democratic transformation, followed by an analysis of 
the rules that have governed the process of budgeting for defense in Poland between 1993 
and 2003.  
To provide a clean picture of the distribution of power among the different actors 
in the budget cycle and the role of the legislature in the control of defense spending, this 
chapter is subdivided into three main parts. 
The first section provides an overview of the political environment and 
institutional reform that occurred between 1993 and 2003. The second section describes 
the reforms of the Polish Armed Forces that occurred during this period, while the third 
section focuses on the role of legislative authority within the defense budget process and 
its evolution. 
B.  POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS  
The Little Constitution did not eliminate the ambiguity that existed among 
executive authorities. On the contrary, it implemented a dual executive system, whereby 
the government and the president shared control over the national defense, internal and 
foreign affairs. It must be said that under the Little Constitution, the Government had no 
political responsibility to the President. Only if the Parliament had no ability to form the 
Board of Ministers in the parliamentary mode could a presidential government have 
appeared.37   
Moreover, presidential power regarding the Sejm was limited by the Little 
Constitution in several ways. Firstly, the veto over legislation was maintained, although 
the Sejm could overrule it by a two-thirds majority. Secondly, dissolution of the 
                                                 
37 Ujazdowski, Kazimierz. “The Constitutional and Political Position of the Executive Power in 
Poland after 1989.” 1997. Online. Internet. Available http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/95-97/ujazdow.pdf 
(4 January 2004). 
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Parliament was limited to specific conditions such as the Sejm’s failure to pass a budget 
in the required time, to form a new government or to nominate an alternative prime 
minister when passing  a successful vote of no confidence (as in Suchocka’s case). 
Finally, the process of nominating a new prime minister, as well as dismissing an 
incumbent, was dependent only upon the presence of a parliamentary majority.38 
However, changes to the law derived from the Little Constitution did not stabilize 
the political situation. On the contrary, they caused the President, the Parliament, and the 
Government to engage in open confrontation over the issue of political predominance in 
Poland. This period was characterized by Walesa’s political incompetence and 
willfulness, his lack of collaboration with the Suchocka government, and a deeply 
divided and fragmented Parliament which behaved at its worst during 1993.39 As a result, 
the Sejm passed a vote of no confidence and dismissed the Suchocka government, 
following which, President Lech Walesa dissolved the Parliament.40 
Just before being dissolved, the Sejm passed the Electoral Law on 28 May 1993. 
This law was an attempt to stabilize the future political system by applying the d’Hondt 
electoral method. This was intended to address the problems associated with portionality 
under the previous system of Hare-Niemeyer (used in 1991).41 (Table 1) The major 
changes that were imposed by the Electoral Law were as follows:42 
• Three electoral thresholds were established to eliminate small 
parties from the political life. Only parties that collected at least 
five percent of the national vote and eight percent in the case of 
electoral coalitions were entitled to gain seats in the Parliament.  
                                                 
38 Sanford, George. Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics Since 1989, N.Y.: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 84. 
39 Ibid., pp. 143-145. 
40 Mair, Peter, and Morlino, Leonardo. “In Search of Democratic Governance in Post-Communist 
Poland, an Institutional Perspective.” April 2000. Online. Internet. Available 





• In order to distribute 391 of the 460 seats, the country was divided 
into 52 districts (37 in 1991), each having three to 17 deputies. 
Thus, the average number of seats per district was reduced from 
10.5 to 7.51.  
• The remaining 69 seats were assigned proportionally to those 
parties, which gained at least seven per cent of the national vote.  
• Minority groups were allowed to submit national lists if they were 
able to register their list in at least five districts. 
 
Crystallization of the Polish Party System 1991-1997 
Election Year 1991 1993 1997 
Number of deputies 460 460 460 
District magnitude 10.5 7.5 7.5 
Electoral Formula LR-Hare d'Hondt d'Hondt 
Constituency seats 391 391 391 




National seats 69 69 69 
Threshold 5% or winning seats 
in at least 5 districts 
7% 7% 
Number of lists  111 35 31 
Number of candidates 6980 8787 6433 
Turnout (%) 43,2 52.1 47.9 
Number of parties elected 29 7 6 
 
Table 1. Sejm Election Results 1991-199743 
 
As a result of the introduction of the Electoral Law, the Parliament elected on 19 
September 1993 was, for the first time after the collapse of communism, able to form a 
government majority. This majority was comprised of the SLD and PSL, the largest 
parties in both houses of the Parliament, creating leftist governments, first under 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
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Waldemar Pawlak of the PSL, and later under Jozef Oleksy of the SLD.44 Thus, the Sejm 
and the governments were in an extremely strong position to lay down the directions for 
the new constitution and improve the existing laws. 
However, relations between President Walensa and the Pawlak and Oleksy 
governments were poor. Walensa clashed continually with successive prime ministers 
over various issues, accusing governments of neglecting matters of state importance 
while dealing with personal and party interests.45 This not only significantly slowed the 
process of shaping a new constitution but also hampered the governments’ attempts to 
eliminate gaps in Polish law.46 That is why the Little Constitution was not amended 
much.  
Nevertheless, one of the most important changes to this document was the 
amendment that required a dissolved Sejm to continue its constitutional duty until a new 
Sejm could be elected (in order to prevent a situation like what happened in 1993). 
Another significant change to the Constitution of 1992 allowed the President to dissolve 
Parliament within a three month period following its failure to pass the budget. The 
previous time period was 21 days.47 
Fortunately, the “legislative power” of the Sejm and the effectiveness of the 
government increased when Aleksader Kwasniewski won the presidential elections in 
1995. “Kwasniewski’s presidential victory brought not only an end to ‘cohabitation’ but 
also peace to inter-institutional relations, thereby paving the way for the adoption of the 
new constitution.”48 
                                                 
44 Sanford, George. Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics Since 1989, N.Y.: 
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45 “Background Notes: Poland.” 2004. Online. Internet. Available 
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47 Ibid., p. 84. 
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The Constitution of 2 April 1997 was signed by President Kwasniewski on 16 
June and came into force three months later. It maintained presidential power as “the 
supreme representative of the Polish Republic,” guardian of its constitution, the 
continuity of state power, sovereignty, and security. However, as a lesson learned from 
Walesa’s presidency, presidential power was limited by making several changes to the 
Little Constitution:49 
• The President lost his power to nominate “the three key ministers” 
of Foreign and Internal Affairs and Defense. 
• The President lost his power to veto the annual budget. 
• A presidential veto over legislation could be overridden by the 
Sejm with a three-fifths majority (a two-thirds majority was 
required under the Little Constitution). 
• The President could dissolve parliament only if it failed to pass the 
budget within four months of presentation, if the Sejm was not able 
to appoint the government and simultaneously did not accept a 
cabinet proposed by the President.  
• The President could dismiss the government only if the absence of 
a Sejm majority resulted in a deadlock. 
The adoption of the 1997 Constitution firmly established a semi-presidential 
system that had emerged since 1989, with some modifications to strengthen the position 
of the government vis-à-vis the Sejm and the President.  
In 1997, Post-Solidarity parties, in order to regain power in the approaching 
parliamentary election of 1997, created an electoral coalition called the Solidarity 
Electoral Action (AWS) composed of more than 30 right-wing parties. “The component 
parties of the AWS differed in many ways but were united in one conviction – to defeat 
the SLD at the next general election in September 1997.”50 As a result, two parties with 
roots in the Solidarity movement, the AWS and Freedom Union (UW), received 261 of 
460 seats and 51 of 100 seats in the Sejm and Senat respectively.51 Following this 
election, Jerzy Buzek of the AWS created a government.  
                                                 




Because the ruling coalition consisted of so many political groups during the first 
year of the coalition’s life, 30 public conflicts were noted between the partners, 
significantly decreasing the effectiveness of the government.52 Fortunately, in the 
following years, the government gained political consensus and strengthened both the 
political and economic systems by implementing reforms of the social security system, 
local governments, healthcare, the pension system and the Armed Forces.  
The Buzek government, supported by President Aleksander Kwasniewski (he 
signed 223 out of 233 bills sent to him for signature within the statutory 21-day period),53 
provided four years of governmental stability, including Poland’s accession to NATO in 
March 1999. The cohabitation between the President and the government resulted not 
only in the Sejm passing a significant number of laws but also the decisive reelection of 
President Kwasniewski on the first ballot during the presidential election held in 2000. 
(Table 2) 
 
Source of Legislative Initiative 
Source First Sejm Second Sejm Third Sejm* 
 Introduced Passed Introduced Passed Introduced Passed 
Deputies 225 47 250 103 373 147 
Senat 9 4 9 4 19 7 
President 10 4 19 4 10 4 
Council of Ministers 91 47 220 137 365 232 
Civic initiative - - - - 1 - 
The work of the Sejm 
No. of sessions 45 115 101** 
Draft-laws 335 826 948 
Laws passed 94 473 450 
Resolutions 135 296 198 
Declarations 506 496 1151 
* Until 30 June 2000. ** Until 20 February 2001. 
 
Table 2. Source of Legislative Initiative and the Work of the Sejm 54 
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53 Ibid., p. 119. 
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However, the implementation of a package of three fundamental reforms of public 
finance caused overheating of the state budget.55 “The new pension and healthcare 
systems ran a huge deficit, which was largely covered by state budget subsidies.”56 This 
led to a deterioration of the quality and availability of healthcare services, as well as 
delays in pension payments. As a result, the Government was no longer supported by the 
public. Thus, in the parliamentary election of 2001, both the AWS and the UW were 
practically eliminated from the Sejm (gaining only 5.6 and 3.1 percent of available seats, 
respectively).57  
Poles switched their support again to the SLD, which had formed an electoral 
alliance with the UP. This alliance achieved the best electoral result of the Third 
Republic, with 216 seats (41.04 percent) in the Sejm and 75 seats (75 percent) in the 
Senate.58 Subsequently, the SLD-UP formulated a new coalition with the PSL, led by 
Leszek Miller as Prime Minster.   
To sum up, during this time the pendulum of power swung between right and left, 
led by six prime ministers, one of whom served twice.59 In such an unpredictable 
political environment, “efforts were made to achieve an agreeable balance between  
 
 
                                                 
55 The first of them was the introduction of the new local government levels in order to decrease the 
centralization of public funds management. The second was the healthcare system that, by creating so-
called Health Funds, switched financial responsibility from the state budget to funding collected by a 
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agreement that the working population funded benefits for the generation of pensioners. The reform 
converted the system into a partly capital-based system. 
56 Misiag, Wojciech and Niedzielski, Adam. “Openness and Transparency of Public Finance in Poland 
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57 Sanford, George. Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics Since 1989, N.Y.: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 187. 
58 Ibid., pp. 187-188. 
59 “Lost of Solidarity.” October 2001. Internet. Online. Available 
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democratic governability through stable majorities and proportionality of political 
representation.”60 However, the Polish party system and the parties themselves were far 
from having achieved their final form. 
C. THE REFORM OF THE ARMED FORCES  
In the early 1990’s, Poland decided to found its new security policy on three 
principal pillars.61 One of them was integration with NATO, the alliance that was 
perceived as a foe before the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989. However, NATO 
itself lost its primary mission “to deter or defend against an attack on Western Europe by 
the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact alliance because of the breakup of both the Soviet Union and 
the Warsaw Pact”.62 Thus, NATO was forced to redefine its role. As part of that 
redefinition, the alliance invited the foreign ministries of all the former Warsaw Pact 
members to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on 
political and security issues.63 As a result, on 10 January 1994, Poland was invited to join 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP).64 
The main goals of the PfP were to intensify political and military cooperation in 
order to increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and finally enlarge NATO by adding 
the participating countries.  Membership in the PfP obligated Poland to pursue and fulfill 
the following objectives:65  
• Maintain capability and readiness to contribute to operations under 
the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 
                                                 
60 Mair, Peter and Morlino, Leonardo. “In Search of Democratic Governance in Post-Communist 
Poland, an Institutional Perspective.” April 2000. Online. Internet. Available 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/copenhagen/ws1/chan.PDF  (1 March 
2004). 
61 See Chapter IIC. 
62 United States. Congressional Budget Office Paper. Integrating New Allies Into NATO. October, 
2000, p. IX. 
63 Jabloniski, Jaroslaw. The Key Role of NATO Accession on Poland’s Democratic Transformation, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, 2002, p. 22. 
64 “Partnership for Peace: Framework Document issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council.” January 1994. Online. Internet. Available 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110b.htm  (14 April 2004).  
65 Ibid. 
 24
• Develop cooperative military relations with NATO in order to 
undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and 
rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently 
be agreed upon. 
• Provide transparency over national defense planning and budgeting 
processes. 
• Ensure democratic control of defense forces. 
However, Poland was not even close to fulfilling any of these requirements at the 
beginning of 1994. After five years of the gradual degradation of military capabilities, the 
Polish Armed Forces were not capable of maintaining sufficient levels of readiness in 
order to take part in any operation outside Polish borders. The priority of economic 
reforms over military ones caused severe defense budget cuts. Spending for defense was 
reduced 60 percent between 1989 and 1993.66 This fact led to a situation where funds 
were too low even to maintain Polish equipment in a status quo condition, much less to 
provide for modernization. As a result, military cooperation between the Polish Armed 
Forces and NATO was almost impossible.  
Moreover, national defense planning and budgeting processes were not 
transparent at all. The planning and budgeting system of the Polish Armed Forces was 
based on annual budget cycles. Lack of any documents and plans made that process 
unpredictable even from one year to another. In addition, the Sejm had limited 
supervision over military administration due to the simplified accounting method that 
was in force at the time.67 
Finally, a struggle between President Walensa and the Olszewski government in 
1992 over the actual scope of presidential authority on defense matters resulted in 
ambiguity concerning control over the army. The first civilian Minister of Defense, Jan 
Parys, described his mission as a “struggle over the future of the political system in 
Poland: whether the system will be democratic or whether dictatorship will prevail.”68  
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The problem had roots in the institutional reforms of the early 1990’s when the 
MoND was divided into two separate divisions: a military General Staff (an exclusively 
military body) and a civilian-military Ministry. However, ministerial access to military 
resources was possible only through the General Staff (GS). As a result, the GS became 
“a semi-independent institution able to regulate the amount of information available to 
the minister as well as to decide on implementation of ministerial decisions.”69  
It led to a highly ambiguous situation when, without the knowledge of the 
Minister of Defense, one of the President’s aides, Jerzy Milewski, met with senior 
officers and announced that Gen. Tadeusz Wielecki was the President’s choice as the new 
chief of the General Staff. Parys interpreted this situation as a political end run around his 
office by the armed forces, and portrayed it as a threat to Polish democracy. This 
situation caused a major dispute over whether the President or the defense minister would 
exert dominant control over the armed forces. In the aftermath, Parys was forced to resign 
because presidential prerogatives were greater than the constitutional power assigned to 
the Minister of Defense. Subsequently, Walensa appointed Gen. Tadeusz Wielecki as the 
new chief of the General Staff.  
As a result of Parys’ dismissal, Gen. Wielecki, supported by President Lech 
Walensa, was able to minimize political control over the military. He duplicated the 
ministerial departments in the General Staff and consequently took over control of 
financial, personnel and defense planning.70  Moreover, this situation led to political 
involvement of the “flag officers”. Namely, generals contested the principles of civilian 
control, the political leadership, and openly condemned military reform plans.71  
In September 1994, the biggest political scandal regarding the armed forces 
occurred. At the Army’s range in Drawsko, President Walesa, Defense Minister Piotr 
Kolodziejczyk, Chief of the General Staff General Wielecki, and other senior officers met 
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at a dinner and took an informal vote of no confidence in the civilian Minister of Defense 
at the suggestion of the President. The “Drawsko affair” and subsequent official 
statements of General Wielecki (August 1995), in which he attacked politicians and 
bitterly criticized military policy of the Government, revealed the weaknesses of civilian 
control over the army. These events were perceived both in Poland and abroad as a threat 
to Polish democracy in general and particularly to the membership in NATO.72  
Fortunately, the crisis was solved after the presidential election in the autumn of 
1995, when Aleksander Kwasniewski became the new President of the Republic of 
Poland. President Kwasnieski signed new legislation that subordinated the Chief of the 
General Staff to the Prime Minister and to the Minister of Defense.73 
The Parys and Drawsko affairs created obvious consensus for a constitutional 
order that would give civilian defense ministers rather than the President dominant power 
over the control of the armed forces. Thus, the Constitution of 2 April 1997 (still in 
effect) assigns the “real control” over development and managing of Polish security 
policy to the Government. Namely, the President retains the title of the Supreme 
Commander of the Armed Forces, but article 134(6) gives the Parliament and Council of 
Ministers the power to define the President’s function as Supreme Commander.74 
Moreover, in the aftermath of the Drawsko affair, the Constitution of 1997 states that “the 
armed forces shall observe neutrality regarding political matters and shall be subject to 
civil and democratic control.”75 The Constitution of 1997 finally established the 
fundamental elements of democratic control over the Armed Forces, one of the most 
important conditions attached to membership in the Alliance.  
Another important step towards NATO membership was adoption by the Council 
of Ministers of the “Outlines of the Government Programme for the Armed Forces 
Modernization 1998-2012” in September 1997 (later called the “Programme for 
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Integration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Modernization of the Polish 
Armed Forces 1998-2012”).76 This program implied the creation of “a smaller but more 
capable force structure with well-equipped, mobile and efficient forces.”77 According to 
that plan, manpower would be reduced from 241,750 in 1997 to 180,000 in 2002, with 
further cuts to a level between 155,000 and 160,000 in subsequent years. Moreover, it set 
the increase of expenditures on equipment, infrastructure and research and development 
from $.32 billion in 1997 to $1.23 billion in 2012.78  
According to the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR), the “Military 
2012 program”79 laid a solid framework for modernizing the Polish armed forces in line 
with NATO and, once approved and funded, would provide foundation and predictability 
for full integration with NATO.80 A detailed description of Poland’s Procurement Plans 
according to the “Programme for Integration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
and Modernization of the Polish Armed Forces 1998-2012” is provided in the Appendix. 
As a result of the introduction of democratic control over the armed forces and 
deep doctrinal and organizational restructuring of the military, Poland was invited to join 
the Alliance during the Madrid Summit in July 1997, and subsequently, on March 12, 
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As a new member of NATO, Poland faced new military challenges. Namely, the 
strategic objectives of the Polish armed forces were not only to ensure secure conditions 
for exercising national interests by defending them against external crisis or war threats, 
but also “to participate in common defense of the territories of NATO member states.”82 
However, technical upgrade of the army and development of the skills of armed 
forces personnel in order to achieve interoperability and compatibility with NATO forces 
were not treated as urgent tasks. Thus, the “Program of Integration with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization and Modernization of the Polish Armed Forces 1998-2012” 
that had been adopted by the Government was only partially implemented due to 
insufficient funding for its realization.83 The process of modernization of the Polish 
armed forces was rejected in favor of the reforms of the healthcare and pensions 
systems.84 
No significant changes occurred until adoption of a new “Security Strategy of the 
Polish Republic”85 in January 2000, and subsequently, the “Programme of Restructuring 
and Technical Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland 2001-2006” 
that was aimed at fulfilling Alliance objectives (currently in progress). Namely, it aims 
for “achievement of full interoperability with NATO by one-third of the Polish armed 
forces, which would facilitate co-operation with allied forces on the territory of Poland 
and beyond it.”86 
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The importance of introducing this program was underscored by the fact that three 
years after gaining NATO membership, the Polish armed forces were still struggling to 
meet NATO Force Goals. The situation was further complicated by new requirements 
generated from the Defense Capabilities Initiative. Namely, the “Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) proposed in its defense plan for 2001-2006 that Poland 
will participate in the implementation of 180 force goals and long-term commitments.”87 
The Polish armed forces went through a turbulent period from 1993 to 2003. The 
process of transforming Poland’s military was more difficult and slower than expected.  
These difficulties were particularly compounded by reforms necessitated by 
Poland’s entry into NATO. Poland became a member of the Alliance in March 1999, and 
in the same month NATO began the bombing campaign in Kosovo. Thus, the first test of 
loyalty and interoperability came very soon. Namely, “the yardstick of the Polish armed 
forces’ combat readiness and allied solidarity was their participation in Operation ‘Allied 
Force’ in Kosovo.”88 In addition, from 1993 to 2000, 42,000 Polish soldiers participated 
in 46 peacekeeping operations led by the UN, OSCE, EU and NATO.89 Consequently, 
NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson praised Poland for being a reliable NATO 
member during his February 2002 visit to Poland.  
D. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET 
In the early 1990’s, defense budget planning procedures were based only on a 
one-year planning perspective due to the unpredictability of the political environment, a 
poor economic situation, and lack of state long-term plans regarding the Polish armed 
forces.  
Moreover, the only law related to public finance was the Budget Law passed on 5 
January 1991.90 Its objective was only to “adjust the budget institution operating under 
the centrally planned economy to the new economic regime.”91  
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Under these circumstances, the MoND was forced to evaluate the country’s 
defense needs and create a priority list regarding spending within the Polish armed forces. 
There were insufficient funds to cover all required expenditures.92 As a result, the 
General Staff created mid-term perspective plans for the years 1991-1995 and 1993-
1995.93 These documents had a purely internal character and were used by the General 
Staff as a tool to allocate available resources and to estimate essential needs of the armed 
forces in the applicable time-frames.  
The first noticeable sign of incoming changes related to the defense budget 
occurred on 9 November 1993, when Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak indicated “an 
urgent need to review possibilities of the national economy to guarantee a minimum three 
percent share of military expenditures in the gross domestic product (GDP).”94 Moreover, 
he stressed that the problem of the restructuring of the arms industry would receive top 
priority in the government’s activities.95  
At this time, however, the Polish government was reluctant to put money into the 
defense budget. There was a noticeable gap between verbal assurances offered by the 
government and the reality of the funds released by a legislated budget. 
When Poland joined PfP in 1994, it became obvious that the Polish armed forces 
required significant and immediate reforms not only by downsizing its manpower but 
also by equipping them with advanced military tools and weapons adjusted to 
international standards. However, the 1995 Budget Act did not assign sufficient funds for 
modernization. On the contrary, art. 45 stated that only 367,935,000 PLN was devoted to 
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defense investment, or 7 percent of the total expenditures in 1995.96 As a result, further 
degradation of investment programs took place and procurement of military equipment 
was postponed. “Cannibalism” occurred, as significant defense budget cuts led to the 
situation when assigned funds were too low to maintain Polish equipment in a status quo 
condition. Thus, in order to have at least some equipment working properly, parts from 
one or more devices were taken and put on another.  
These facts led to a parliamentary debate on defense issues that took place in 
February 1995. As matter of fact, it was the first parliamentary debate over national 
defense since the end of WWII.97  The result of this debate was the adoption of a 
resolution which made recommendations for setting defense spending at 3 percent of the 
GDP by the end of 1997.98 Moreover, it stressed that the Government should allocate 
more funds for military equipment modernization. Although this resolution did not have 
the binding power of a legislative act, the Government was obliged to take into 
consideration the Sejm’s recommendations indicated in this document while shaping the 
budgets for coming years.99  
Additionally, in order to gain better control over budget performance and 
government activities, the Sejm set up the Budget Studies Division in 1995. The division 
was responsible for analysis of materials submitted by the Government, preparation of 
written opinions on the textual part of budget bills, participation in all sittings of the 
Public Finance Committee and other subcommittees of the Sejm, formulation of deputies’ 
proposals for amendments and describing the financial consequences of the proposed  
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amendments, and finally executing other requests made by deputies, concerning budget 
issues.100  Thus, the problem of poor preparation of parliamentarians to perform the 
public role assigned to them by the electorate was at least partially addressed.101 
These were important steps towards enhancing the system of defense planning. 
When Poland was invited to join NATO during the Madrid Summit in July 1997, the 
issue of modernization of the Polish armed forces became perceived as important. As a 
result, in September 1997, the Government announced the “Outlines of the Government 
Programme for the Armed Forces Modernization 1998-2012.” This program implied 
creation of a smaller but more capable force with particular emphasis on its 
modernization. According to this plan, expenditures on equipment, infrastructure and 
research and development would increase almost fourfold, from $.32 billion in 1997 to 
$1.23 billion in 2012.102   
However, a few days later on 27 September 1997, a new parliamentary election 
took place, and the new Government was chosen. Although new Prime Minister Jerzy 
Buzek pledged to uphold a 15-year military reform program, no funds were assigned to 
the MoND to fully implement it.103  
Such inconsistency in the government’s activities was possible mainly because of 
lack of transparency of public finance. In 1997, the 1991 Budget Law was the only law 
relating to public finance. Although “many amendments of this act were introduced, but  
                                                 
100 Stankiewicz, Wieslaw. “Budget Analysis for Parliaments: The Case of Poland.” 68th IFLA Council 
and General Conference. 18-24 August 2002. pp. 3-4.  
101 See Chapter IID. 
102 “NATO Resists Pressures to Militarize Central Europe.” Online. Internet. Available 
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP28.htm  (2 April 2004). 
103 Mroz, Marcin. “Program przebudowy i modernizacji technicznej Sil Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej 
w latach 2001-2006 w seietle informacji Rady Ministrow o jego realizacji w roku 2001.” Warszawa: Druk 
Sejmowy nr 100. 27 November 2001. p. 1. 
 33
instead of improving the operation of the public finance system they only made it 
excessively complicated and incoherent, which had a detrimental effect on its efficiency 
and transparency.”104 
For example, the budget bill was created almost without the supervision of the 
Prime Minister. Namely, he was not able to supervise the work on the budget bill, due to 
lack of a financial bureau in his office, until the last moment, when the Minister of 
Finance presented the budget to the Board of Ministers.  
It is worth to remind the words of Hubert Izdebski, who indicates the 
absence of unity of the Government in the budget works: ‘the tasks and 
priorities are defined by the apparatus of the Ministry of Finance that 
creates the project independently, without proper consultations, and with 
its absence in the arbitration mode. The project reach the Board of 
Ministers so late, the Board is forced to accept it in a proposed version, 
with insignificant corrections. In result, it is quite possible (what happened 
in the end of 1992) that even the members of the Government call in 
question in Parliament some of the solutions of the budget bill’.105 
Fortunately, in 1997, the new Constitution was adopted. Chapter X of this 
Constitution “Public Finances,” obliged the Sejm to pass a new, comprehensive legal act 
regulating this area. As a result, on January 1, 1999, the Budget Law that had been 
effective since 1991, was replaced with the Public Finance Act of 26 November 1998.106  
This document defines in detail the procedure of working and endorsing the 
budget as well as the consequences of violating public finance discipline.  
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At the end of millennium, the system of legal acts regulating the budget of the 
Ministry of National Defense consisted of the Constitution of 1997, the Public Finance 
Act, the Programme for Integration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 
Modernization of the Polish Armed Forces 1998-2012, and finally, Target Force Goals 
adopted by Poland in agreement with NATO. 
When Poland joined NATO in March 1999, it was obliged to raise defense 
spending to 2.2 percent of the GDP and concentrate financial resources on investment 
rather than manpower and maintenance.107 These guidelines played an important role in 
shaping a new plan for the development of the armed forces.  
As a result, after two years of planning at the General Staff, the Programme of 
Restructuring and Technical Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Poland for 2001-2006 was launched. The chief of the General Staff, Gen. Czeslaw Piatas, 
said that this programme initiated “the most profound and probably most rapid military 
restructuring among the allied countries.”108 
However, the most important fact that makes this plan credible and workable was 
that the Government decided to guarantee stable defense spending in the form of a law. 
On 25 May 2001, the “Law on Restructuring, Technical Modernization and Financing of 
the Polish Armed Forces in the Years 2001-2006” was passed by the Sejm. This law 
required that 1.95 percent of GDP be provided for defense spending over the next six 
years. Moreover, in the case of recession, minimum levels of expenditures were 
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MoND Budget Expenditures 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Amount in billion PLN 16.1 17 17.9 19 20.2 
As a % of GDP 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 
 
Table 3. Assumed Level of Spending over 2002-2006 According to The Law on 
Restructuring, Technical Modernization and Financing of the Polish Armed 
Forces.109 
 
After Poland’s accession to NATO, the priority of army modernization was made 
clear as never before during the annual Polish Armed Forces Commanders’ Conference 
on 11 December 2000. At this event, Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek and the Defense 
Minister, Bronislaw Komorowski, both formally indicated that “the FY01 budget will 
provide enough money as to start the official tender procedures for the multi-role fighter 
programme.”110 
However, the issue of a multi-role aircraft for the Air Force was beyond the scope 
of the Programme of Restructuring and Technical Modernization of the Armed Forces of 
the Republic of Poland for 2001-2006 and exceeded the possibilities of the defense 
budget. As a result, a separate parliamentary law for the aircraft acquisition programme, 
which approved a prospective transaction, was passed by the Sejm on 22 June 2001, i.e., 
the “Equipping the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland with Multi-Role Aircraft 
Act.”111 This law guaranteed financing for the transaction in years 2002-2010 from the  
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state budget, on the condition that expenses would not exceed 0.5 per cent of GDP, 
whereas in 2011-2015, the expenditures would be determined as part of budget bills for 
particular years.112  
However, it should be noted that the key to the successful modernization of the 
Polish Armed Forces, which paved the way for passing both the Law on Restructuring, 
Technical Modernization and Financing of the Polish Armed Forces in the Years 2001 -
2006 and the Equipping the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland with Multi-Role 
Aircraft Act was a so-called “Offset Bill of September 1999.”113 This law on “certain 
compensation agreements concluded in connection with the agreements on supplies for 
defense and security purpose,”114 requires that every contract for military equipment and 
weapons supplied to Poland worth more than 5 million Euros (art. 2.1) must be matched 
by the supplier’s offset commitments amounting to not less than what is provided for by 
the basic agreement (art. 6.1). 
The purpose of these regulations was to ensure that military and civilian industries 
in Poland would become a beneficiaries of the transaction and stimulate the Polish 
economy. For example, in 2001, “under the terms of supply of the Spanish transportation 
aircraft ‘CASA’, the Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) undertook to 
invest more than $212 million in the Polish economy.”115 
However, the issue regarding obligatory offsets has been controversial because 
the 1999 compensation law did not state clearly the Polish government’s preferences 
regarding allocations of “compensation agreements.”116 Having closed the tenders for 
multi-task aircraft, wheeled armored personnel carriers and anti-tank guided missiles in 
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2002, the Polish economy was about to be reinforced by several billion dollars. The 
allocation of the “compensation agreements” became a problem because the 1999 law 
indicated only that one-half of investments were to be directed to defense sectors whereas 
the other half will go to other branches of the economy without further specifications. 
Thus, the suppliers chose where to allocate the second half of the offset investments 
without the supervision of the Polish government. 
Summing up, it is appropriate to quote Prime Minister Leszek Miller, who in his 
Sejm expose in October 2001, said  
In spite of the poor condition of public finances, the restructuring and 
technical modernization of the armed forces will continue, guided by the 
aim of making the forces more mobile and ready to participate in the fight 
against terrorism. The program of developing arms and equipment will be 
implemented.117   
Over the two years since his expose, the Polish armed forces are being 
modernized in accordance with the Law on Restructuring, Technical Modernization and 
Financing of the Polish Armed Forces in the Years 2001 -2006. (Table 4 and Figure 3) 
Amount in million PLN (current prices) 
Part 29 -MoND Budget As % of  
GDP State Budget 
Years  GDP 
State Budget 
Expenditures  Total  
Section 752 
"National 
Defense"* Part 29 Section 752 Part 29 Section 752 
1991 80,882.90 24,185.80 1,821.20 1,807.10 2.25% 2.23% 7.53% 7.47% 
1992 114,944.20 38,189.00 2,564.40 2,536.50 2.23% 2.21% 6.72% 6.64% 
1993 155,780.00 50,242.80 3,846.50 3,309.20 2.47% 2.12% 7.66% 6.59% 
1994 210,407.30 68,865.00 5,117.00 4,127.50 2.43% 1.96% 7.43% 5.99% 
1995 306,318.30 91,169.70 6,594.40 5,249.40 2.15% 1.71% 7.23% 5.76% 
1996 385,449.10 108,661.30 8,313.20 6,003.30 2.16% 1.56% 7.65% 5.52% 
1997 469,372.10 127,919.80 10,076.70 7,275.00 2.15% 1.55% 7.88% 5.69% 
1998 550,405.60 139,751.50 11,686.90 8,358.70 2.12% 1.52% 8.36% 5.98% 
1999 611,576.20 138,425.20 12,242.30 9,209.40 2.00% 1.51% 8.84% 6.65% 
2000 685,000.00 151,154.90 13,149.40 9,832.50 1.92% 1.44% 8.71% 6.51% 
2001 721,600.00 181,604.10 14,032.20 8,803.10 1.94% 1.22% 7.73% 4.85% 
2002 742,500.00 185,101.60 14,590.50 9,333.60 1.97% 1.26% 7.88% 5.04% 
2003** 784,100.00 194,411.70 15,323.00 10,227.20 1.95% 1.30% 7.88% 5.26% 
* Section 752 ”National Defense,” see Chapter IV.B.1. for a detailed description. 
** Source of the data for 2003, the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Poland118 
Table 4. MoND Budget Expenditures as a Share of GDP and of State Budget119 
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MoND BUDGET EXPENDITURES AS A % OF GDP AND AS A % OF
STATE BUDGET
 
Figure 3.   MoND Expenditures over the Years 1991-2003120 
   
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The period between 1993 and 2003 witnessed significant institutional and 
constitutional changes in the process of creating a new democratic political culture in 
Poland. These changes proved more difficult than writing the new constitution. A 
consensus was reached between the right and left sides of the Parliament regarding 
Poland’s external policies that remained steady. That consensus centered on integration 
with NATO and the European Union as priorities. 
It should be noted, however, that process of budgeting in Poland between 1993 
and 2001 was not transparent. There was a noticeable gap between the various 
governments’ assurances to increase defense spending and the execution of that policy. 
For example, the Program for Integration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
and Modernization of the Polish Armed Forces 1998-2012 was adopted by the 
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government, but no funds were assigned to the MoND to fully implement it. Such 
inconsistencies in the government’s activities created situation where defense budget 
expenditures were unpredictable even from one year to the next. 
The situation changed in May 2001, when the government decided to guarantee 
defense spending in the form of a law. The Programme of Restructuring and Technical 
Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland for 2001-2006, in 
conjunction with the Financial Act,121 created “a modest but stable and guaranteed 
financial platform for the yearly allocations, irrespective of the government in power.”122 
However, it should be underlined that the system of public finance regarding national 
defense has not reached its final form; rather, it has a temporary character. 
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IV. GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND THE DEFENSE 
BUDGET PROCESS, 2003-2004. 
A.  INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents and analyzes the process of developing defense budgets in 
Poland in the years 2003-2004. In order to provide a clear picture of the budget cycle, this 
chapter is subdivided into three parts.  
The first section provides an overview of the contemporary governmental system. 
The purpose of this part is to identify the role of the executive and legislature during the 
different stages of the budget process.  
The second section focuses on defense budgetary procedures by level of 
development. Three subsections comprise this part. The first describes the creation of the 
defense budget in the MoND and portrays procedures within the government during this 
stage. The second subsection depicts the activities of the Parliament, while the third 
subsection describes the options given to the President as the process is completed.  
Finally, the last part of this chapter concentrates on control over the execution of 
the defense budget once it has been approved by the Parliament and the President. 
B.  GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM AND BUDGET PROCESS 
Since 1991, Poland has had a hybrid presidential-parliamentary system based on 
the separation of powers. In accordance with the Constitution of April 2, 1997, there is a 
triple division of power in Poland. 123 With respect to legislative authority, the vital 
organs of state are the Sejm and the Senate of the Republic of Poland. Executive 
authority rests with the President and the Council of Ministers, and judicial authority is 
held by the courts and tribunals.124 
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Relations between the Parliament, the President, and the government are based on 
“rationalized parliamentarianism.” Under this concept, the Sejm plays a primary role in 
the legislative process and in relations with the government if there is a stable majority in 
the Sejm. If not, the President gains greater influence over the legislative process and 
government. 
This structure affects the a government is formed. Namely, the President appoints 
the Prime Minister (PM) within 14 days of the convocation of the Sejm after an election 
or following the resignation of his predecessor. The PM then has another 14 days to form 
a government and to obtain a vote of confidence from the Sejm through an absolute 
majority.125 If he fails to do so, the Sejm has another 14 days to appoint its PM and, on 
the prime minister’s motion, the other members of the government. The President must 
accept them if a majority of the Sejm is in favor.  
However, if neither of these procedures results in a government approved by the 
Sejm, the President has another opportunity to appoint the government, but this time the 
vote of confidence can be passed by a simple majority.126 If this stage fails, the President 
calls for elections to form a new Sejm.127 
Once nominated and approved, the PM and the Council of Ministers become the 
dominant authority within the executive branch. This is confirmed by the 1997 
Constitution through article 146. It states that the Council of Ministers shall conduct the 
internal affairs and foreign policy of the Republic of Poland, manage the government 
administration and conduct the affairs of State not reserved to other State organs or local 
self-governments. The Council also exercises real control over development and 
managing of Polish security policy even though the President is designated as the 
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“Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland.128 Article 134(2) 
of the Constitution states that the President “shall exercise command over the Armed 
Forces through the Minister of National Defense,” whereas article 134(6) gives the 
Council of Ministers and the Parliament the power to define the President’s functions as 
the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.129  
The members of the Council of Ministers are “collectively responsible and 
accountable to the Sejm for the activities of the Council” and are individually responsible 
to this body for “those matters falling within their competence or assigned to them by the 
Prime Minister.”130 The Sejm’s activities are reviewed by the Senat, and scrutinized by 
the President. Finally, the Constitutional Tribunal examines the laws issued by the Sejm 
to ensure that they conform with the Constitution and ratified international agreements. 
On the one hand, the structure for the exercise of executive power ensures that 
power is limited, controlled and coordinated in its employment. Taking into account the 
recent history of Poland, i.e., the Walensa Presidency, implementation of this structure 
was important to move towards stable democracy. On the other hand, the effectiveness of 
the executive branch has been reduced by instability within the political system and a 
wide range of interests in the Sejm. This is particularly the case in the implementation 
and realization of long-term programs. An excellent example of this problem is the 
process of State Budget development.  
In general, the introduction of a draft budget is the sole right of the executive 
branch. The draft budget is submitted to the legislative branch for approval.  Once 
approval has been granted, the budget statute returns to the executive branch for final 
approval and execution. Figure 4 captures the flow of budget events across institutions of 
the State, using the defense budget as an example. 
 
 
                                                 
128 Government of Poland. Constitution of the Republic of Poland. April 1997. Art. 134(1). 
129 Ibid., Art. 134(6). 
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Figure 4.   General Overview of the Defense Budgeting Process in Poland131 
 
1. Development of the Defense Budget within the Ministry of Defense 
and Activities within the Government 
Before examining the process of developing the defense budget within the 
Ministry of Defense, the structure of defense expenditures should be displayed and 
discussed. 
The expenditures of the Ministry of National Defense are classified as “Part 29” 
of the State Budget. This part is further divided into 12 sections. They include, among 
others, these categories of expenditures:132 
• National Defense, called Section 752, is the primary and largest 
portion of the defense budget expenditures directly related to the 
financial needs of the Armed Forces. Expenditures are assigned for 
the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, Central Support, Liaison 
offices for NATO and military personnel in NATO, the Military 
Intelligence Service, Military Police, and Chaplain offices;  
                                                 
131 NPS Report. “Proposed Blueprint for Polish National Acquisition Strategy.” Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey California 2000, p. 40. 
132 Ministry of National Defense. The Budget Department. The Basic Information on The MoND 
Budget for 2003. Warszawa: Departament Budzetowy MON, Departament Wychowania i Promocji 
Obronosci MON. 2003 p. 5. 
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• Social Security provides money for pensions and retirement 
benefits for retired professional soldiers; 
• Public Administration covers the payrolls of the civilians 
employed in the Ministry of National Defense; 
• Other sections (altogether around 10 percent of Part 29) cover 
housing, health care, higher education, schooling, protection of 
national heritage and cultural activities, social welfare, 
administration of justice and public prosecutor’s offices and other 
social activities. 
In order to provide a more complete picture of defense expenditures in Poland, 
Figure 5 displays the structure of Part 29 with the allocations to particular sections for the 
year 2003.  
 
MoND Budget for 2003 without Reserves (Millions PLN) 
 
Section 752 Section 700 Section 803 
Military Lodging 
Agency 
Higher Education National Defense MPLN 352.9  
MPLN 9.823.1 MPLN 321.1 (2.33%) 
(64.9%)  (2.12%) 





MPLN 1.6  (0.52%) 
(0.01%) 
 Section 750 Section 853 
Public Administration Social Welfare PART 29 MPLN 146.7 MPLN 39.5 
MPLN 15,135.6 (0.97%) (0.26%) 
(100%) 
Section 753 Section 854 
Social Security Schemes Other  
MPLN 3,882.0 Social Activities 
MPLN 19.3 (25.65%) 
(0.13%) 
Section 755 Section 801 Section 921 
Administration of Justice & 
Public Prosecutor’s Office 
Schooling National Heritage & 
Culture MPLN 339.0 
MPLN 42.4 MPLN 89.0 (2.24%) 
 (0.28%) (0.59%) 
 
Figure 5.   Structure of MoND Budget for 2003 in Sections133 
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133 Ibid., p. 5. 
Keeping in mind the structure of the defense budget, identification of the most 
important budget actors within the MoND is appropriate. The most prominent players in 
the process of developing defense budgets are the Minister of National Defense, the 
Budget Department, the General Staff, the commanders of the three services, i.e., the 
Land Forces, the Air Forces and the Navy, and commanders of designated units and 
heads of the departments that report directly to the Minister of National Defense. These 
players comprise the MoND Budget Committee, chaired by the Minister of National 
Defense and supported by three Permanent Subcommittees. These Subcommittees are 
comprised mainly of representatives from the Armament Policy, Infrastructure, Budget 
and Supply Departments, and the General Staff.134 The organization of the Permanent 
Subcommittees is as follows:135 
• The Permanent Subcommittee on R&D and Implementation, 
Armament, Military Equipment and Spare Parts Procurement and 
Maintenance is chaired by the Director of the Armament Policy 
Department. 
• The Permanent Subcommittee on Construction Investment is 
chaired by the Director of the Infrastructure Department.  
• The Permanent Subcommittee on Other Expenditures is chaired by 
the Deputy Director of the Budget Department. 
Within the MoND, there are three levels of Budget Holders. The highest level is 
Level I, assigned to the Ministry of National Defense. Level II Budget Holders are the 
commanders of the three services and heads of departments that are directly subordinated 
to the Minister of National Defense. Level III Budget Holders are commanders of units 
that report directly to Level II Budget Holders.  
The process of budget planning within the MoND begins in March. The Budget 
Department, together with the General Staff and Level II Budget Holders, prepare 
estimates for the funding requirements for the next fiscal year.136 The estimates are based 
on the current year spending, adjusted for requirements of the next year expenditures.  
                                                 
134 NPS Report. “Proposed Blueprint for Polish National Acquisition Strategy.” Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey California, 2000, p. 42. 
135 Ibid., p. 42. 
136 In Poland the fiscal year starts on 1 January each year and ends on the last day of the calendar year.  
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These defense budget estimates reflect parliament and governmental regulations and 
international agreements. At the same time, the General Staff establishes military 
priorities for the next year. 
In April, the Budget Department submits estimates of required defense 
expenditures for the next year to the Ministry of Finance in the form of the Material Plan. 
Additionally, a document called the “Guidance of the Minister of National Defense for 
the Defense Budget Planning” is issued in May.137 The main purpose of this Guidance is 
to indicate the most important military goals and tasks for the following year. However, 
this document does not include estimates of the cost associated with the implementation 
of these goals. It serves rather as an outline of tasks perceived by the Ministry of National 
Defense as priorities. For example, the National Defense Priorities tasks for 2003 were: 
• “Increase the pace of technical modernization of the Armed Forces 
connected with the implementation of ‘The Development 
Programme for the Polish Armed Forces over the years 2003-2008; 
• Finance of tasks relating to the membership of NATO (Forces 
Goals agreed upon with NATO, Poland’s contribution to NATO 
Military Budgets and Agencies, NSIP…).”138 
In June, Level II Budget Holders submit their budget proposals to the Budget 
Department. These proposals are subsequently verified by the Permanent Subcommittees.  
In July, the Ministry of Finance announces the spending limits assigned to the 
Ministry of National Defense. To date, these limits have always been lower than the 
needs of the budget holders requested in April.139 However, the budget spending 
guidelines provided by the Ministry of Finance do not allocate resources by sections or 
services. They display only the upper limit of spending assigned to defense. Thus, the 
MoND has to adjust its budget plans to available resources and resubmit the updated 
version of the budget to the Ministry of Finance within 21 days. The Ministry of Finance 
                                                 
137 Struczyk, Kondrad. An Analysis of the Problems and Prospects for Adopting a PPBS-Like System 
by the Polish Ministry of National Defense, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2002, p. 57. 
138 Ministry of National Defense. The Budget Department. The Basic Information on The MoND 
Budget for 2003. Warszawa: Departament Budzetowy MON, Departament Wychowania i Promocji 
Obronosci MON. 2003 p. 11. 
139 Ministry of Finance. Department for State Security Funding.  E-mail to the author from 
Szczepankiewicz, Marian. April 2004. 
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is obliged to finalize and incorporate the revised defense budget within the State Budget 
by September. When this is accomplished, the State Budget is submitted by the Minister 
of Finance to the Council of Ministers for approval (Figure 6) 
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Figure 6.   Defense Budgeting In Poland: Activities within the MoND 
 
Once the State Budget has been submitted to the Council of Ministers, the Prime 
Minister must evaluate the proposed budget. In making a decision regarding the level of 
funding for defense, the Prime Minister cooperates with the Committee for Defense 
Affairs. This Committee is comprised of the Ministers of Finance, Communication, 
Education, Foreign Affairs, and is chaired by the Minister of National Defense. During 
evaluation of the defense budget, the Committee takes into consideration national 
security issues and other governmental priorities, as well as the impact of defense 
spending upon the economy.  
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Once an agreement within the Council of Ministers has been reached regarding 
the levels of spending assigned to particular sections of the State Budget, the Government 
submits the Budget to the Parliament for further consideration and approval. 
2. Budgeting for Defense within the Parliament  
The draft of the State Budget must be presented to the Sejm not later than three 
months before the beginning of the next fiscal year, i.e., before 1 October.140 This draft 
contains a specification of revenues and expenditures of the State for a period of one 
fiscal year. The Budget identifies the most essential financial task of the State in a given 
year.141 The Sejm analyzes the budgets for all activities of the Polish government, 
including the Ministry of National Defense. 
The State Budget is adopted by the Sejm in three readings. The first one takes 
place during a plenary sitting of this Chamber when the whole budget is presented.142 
Afterwards, the entire draft is forwarded to the Public Finance Committee, while its 
respective parts are referred to other committees of the Sejm according to their 
specifications.143 In the case of defense (Part 29), the budget is reviewed by the National 
Defense Committee. Subsequently, the committees submit their proposed amendments to 
the Public Finances Committee. The committees’ amendments are presented by the 
representative of the Public Finance Committee on Second Reading when a full plenary 
debate and vote takes place.  
                                                 
140 Government of Poland. Constitution of the Republic of Poland. April 1997. Art. 222. 
141 Sejm of the Republic of  Poland. “State Budget.” Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/english/prace/okno2.htm  (17 March 2004). 
142 Ordinary bills are passed in three readings, the first may be taken in committee, except for bills 
dealing with the constitution, civil rights, budget and the organization of the state and elections.  
143 “According to the provisions of the rules of procedure (i.e., the Standing Orders) of the Sejm, the 
main function of the committees is to examine and prepare issues which are currently the object of 
parliamentary debates and to deliver opinions on matters which have been referred to them by the Sejm, the 
Marshal or the Presidium. Within the range determined by the Constitution and statutes, the committees 
also work as organs of parliamentary control.” Currently there are 25 standing committees. Sejm of the 
Republic of Poland. Internet. “Committees.” Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/english/sejm/sejm.htm  (17 March 2004). 
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If the bill is non-controversial it can be passed immediately after that on 
Third Reading. Disputed bills are referred back to the committee and the 
amendments are then decided by vote on Third Reading.144 
The adopted statute is referred by the Marshal of the Sejm to the Senat. The Senat 
cannot reject the State Budget as a whole but can propose amendments within a 20-day 
time limit.145 “The resolution of the Senat proposing amendments is deemed adopted if 
the Sejm does not reject it by an absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least half 
of the statutory number of Deputies.”146 After completion of the procedure in the 
Parliament, the State Budget goes directly to the President for final approval and 
signature.  
Table 5 is a display of activities within Parliament and the government with 
regard to defense budgets over the years 1996-2003. In this time frame, noticeable, 
activities of the Parliament concerning defense budgets were rather minor. Parliament 
changed the defense budget only two times during this period. In 2001, the Sejm changed 
the allocation of funds within the Defense Budget; however, it had no impact on the total 
amount. Two years later, in 2003, the Sejm decreased the defense budget by 5.7 MPLN 











                                                 
144 Sanford, George. Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics Since 1989, N.Y.: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 116. 
145 Government of Poland. Constitution of the Republic of Poland. April 1997. Art. 223. 
146 Sejm of the Republic of  Poland. “State Budget.” Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/english/prace/okno2.htm  (17 March 2004). 
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The Defense Budget 1996-2003 Amount in MPLN (current prices) 
Year 
Limits imposed on  the  
Defense Budget                   
by the Ministry of Finance 
Parliamentary 
amendments 
Budget Act     
Part 29 
Changes to  the Defense Budget  
within the year Execution 
1996 8,162.5 - 8,162.5 Higher realization due to use of the reserve funds 
in order to fund an increase in salaries. 
8,313.2 
1997 10,041.2 - 10,041.2 Higher realization due to use of the reserve funds 
in order to pay reparations to victims of Stalin's 
regime. 
10,076.2 
1998 11,577.1 - 11,577.1 Higher realization due to use of the reserve funds 
in order to pay reparations to victims of Stalin's 
regime and an increase in salaries.  
11,686.9 
1999 12,600.0 - 12,600.0 The Defense Budget was under-funded due to the 
shortage of funds in the State Budget (revenue 
was less than predicted). 
12,242.3* 
2000 13,772.9 - 13,772.9 The Defense Budget was under-funded due to the 
shortage of funds in the State Budget (revenue 
was less than predicted). 
13,149.4* 
2001 15,182.7 The Sejm changed the 
allocation of funds 
within the Defense 
Budget. However, it had 
no impact on the total 
amount.   
15,182.7 The Council of Ministers issued an executive 
regulation on 23 October 2001 that reduced 
defense spending by 951.5 MPLN.147 
Additionally, the Defense Budget was under-
funded due to the shortage of funds in the State 
Budget (revenue was less than predicted). 
14,032.2* 
2002 14,264.0 - 14,264.0 The Defense Budget was increased to support 
Afghanistan commitments and armaments’ 
procurement. 
14,590.5 
2003 15,332.9 The Sejm decreased the 
Defense Budget by 5.7 
MPLN.  
15,327.2 5% state tax was imposed on the special funds of 
the Ministry of Defense. (See Chapter V). 
15,323.0* 
* The execution of the defense budget was less than amount depicted in the Budget Act. 
Table 5. The Evolution of Defense Budgets, 1996-2003148 
  
3. The Presidency and the Defense Budget 
The State Budget is submitted to the President by the Marshal of the Sejm. The 
President must sign the Budget within seven days and order its promulgation in the 
Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland.149  However, if the President has objections 
with regard to the Budget, he may refer it to the “Constitutional Tribunal for an 
                                                 
147 The Act of 26 November 1998 on Public Finance, 26 November 1998, Section III, Chapter 3, Art. 
101(2) provides that a “decision on blocking expenditures shall be taken by the Council of Ministers by a 
regulation, after obtaining a positive opinion in this matter from the Sejm committee competent for budget 
matters.” 
148 Ministry of Finance. Department for State Security Funding.  E-mail to the author from 
Szczepankiewicz, Marian. April 2004. 
149 Government of Poland. Constitution of the Republic of Poland. April 1997. Art. 224(1).  A law 
comes into effect on publication, after presidential signature, in the official Bulletin of Laws (Dzienik 
Ustaw). 
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adjudication upon its conformity to the Constitution.”150 He may not refer the Budget to 
the Sejm. In other words, the President is not able to exercise a legislative veto over the 
Budget.151 
The Tribunal has to reply within a period of two months. If this body confirms 
that the Budget violates some constitutional rules, the President cannot sign it until the  
inconsistencies between the Budget and the Constitution have been removed. However, if 
the Tribunal does not find a constitutional problem with the bill, the President is obliged 
to sign it.  
As can be seen from the above, the Sejm can play a primary role in the legislative 
process of the State Budget. However, “if, after 4 months from the day of submission of a 
draft Budget to the Sejm, it has not been adopted or presented to the President of the 
Republic for signature, the President of the Republic may, within the following 14 days, 
order the shortening of the Sejm’s term of office.”152 
  
C. CONTROL OVER THE EXECUTION OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET 
The Ministry of National Defense must present to the Minister of Finance a 
detailed plan of income and expenditure for defense, called the “execution plan,” within 
21 days of promulgation of the Budgetary Act.153 This plan is a detailed description of all 
financial activities within the MoND for a given fiscal year.154 Once accepted by the 
Minister of Finance, this plan becomes a timetable for the execution of the defense 
budget.  
The execution of the State Budget is directed by the Council of Ministers, led by 
the Minister of Finance, who has general control over the execution of the State 
                                                 
150 Sejm of the Republic of  Poland. “State Budget.” Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/english/prace/okno2.htm  (17 March 2004). 
151 Ibid. 
152 Government of Poland. Constitution of the Republic of Poland. April 1997. Art. 225. 
153 Budgetary Act promulgation refers to the day when the Act was published in the Official Bulletin 
of Laws (Dzienik Ustaw). 
154 Government of Poland. Act of 26 November 1998 on Public Finance. 26 November 1998. Section 
III, Chapter 3, Art. 89 (1-2). 
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Budget.155 The defense budget is supervised in detail by the Minister of National 
Defense, who is supported by the MoND Budget Committee, the Budget Department, 
and the Control Department.156 The Minister controls the process of execution of 
financial resources as well as punctuality of income collection via the Level II Budget 
Holders. 
The execution of the State Budget is simultaneously supervised by the Sejm.157 
The Act of Public Finances obliges the Minister of Finance to provide a report regarding 
the execution of the State Budget for the first half-year to the Public Finance Committee 
and the Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK) by 10 September of that year.158  
Furthermore, the Council of Ministers is committed to present to the Sejm and to the 
NIK159 an annual report on execution of the State Budget by 31 May of the year 
following the end of the budgetary year.160 Within 90 days of receipt of this report, the 
Sejm “shall pass a resolution on whether to grant or refuse to grant approval of the 
financial accounts submitted by the Council of Ministers.”161  
The execution of military expenditures is also subject to other controls. For 
example, deputies can direct to the Minister of National Defense interpellations and 
questions concerning execution of the budget at any given time, and citizens can question 
the effectiveness of the Armed Forces by using the mass media.  
                                                 
155 Ibid., Art. 91 (1-2). 
156 Struczyk, Konrad. An Analysis of the Problems and Prospects for Adopting a PPBS-Like System 
by the Polish Ministry of National Defense, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, 2001, p. 71. 
157 Government of Poland. Act of 26 November 1998 on Public Finance. 26 November 1998. Section 
III, Chapter 3, Art. 103(1). 
158 Ibid., Art. 104. 
159 The Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK) is established under the Constitution of April 1997, in the 
Act on the NIK.  The NIK is obliged to submit to the Parliament the annual report on its activity and its 
major audit reports. In the Parliament, there is the standing Commission of State Audit watching the NIK's 
work. The NIK audits local government from the point of view of legality, economic prudence and 
diligence; businesses making use of public resources from the point of view of legality and diligence; other 
units (incl. the government) from the point of view of legality, economic prudence, efficacy and diligence. 
“Supreme Chamber of Control - The NIK Poland.” Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.nao.org.uk/intosai/edp/mandates_nov2002/writeups/poland.htm  (13 June 2004). 
160 Ibid. Art.103(2). 
161 Government of Poland. Constitution of the Republic of Poland. April 1997. Art. 226(2). 
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 D. CONCLUSION 
In summary, there is a triple division of power in Poland. Legislative power is 
kept by the Sejm and the Senat of the Republic of Poland. Executive power resides with 
the President and the Council of Ministers, while judicial authority is held by the courts 
and tribunals. Each of these divisions is involved in the process of the development of 
defense budgets as a part of the State Budget, although their roles are quite distinct.  
The Council of Ministers is responsible for the introduction of a draft budget. 
Once a budget has been drafted, it has to be approved by the Parliament. The legislature 
decides whether governmental proposals for expenditures and revenues should be 
approved, amended, or rejected. Once parliamentary approval has been granted, the 
President must sign the Budget within seven days unless he has objections with regard to 
conformity of the budget to the Constitution. If happens, the Constitutional Tribunal 
scrutinizes the Budget and adjudicates its conformity to the Constitution. If the Tribunal 
confirms that the Budget violates some constitutional rules, the Sejm must remove the 
inconsistencies between the Budget and the Constitution before it can be signed by the 
President.  
The Parliament of the Republic of Poland has played a minor role in the process 
of shaping the defense spending since 1996. The Sejm and the Senat used their 
constitutional power to change governmental proposals regarding defense spending only 




V. THE LAW ON RESTRUCTURING, TECHNICAL 
MODERNIZATION AND FINANCING OF THE POLISH ARMED 
FORCES  IN THE YEARS 2001 – 2006, AND THE ACT OF 
EQUIPPING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
POLAND WITH MULTI-ROLE AIRCRAFT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The system of legal acts regulating the process of budgeting for defense in Poland 
in 2004 consists of five documents. The first is the Constitution of 1997, which defines 
the general principles of the budget, sets limit to national public debt at 60 percent of the 
GDP, and outlines the procedure for the planning of the State Budget.162 The specific 
procedure for developing and approving the defense budget is defined in the Public 
Finance Act of 26 November 1998. The third document is the “Offset Bill of September 
1999” that mandates certain compensation agreements concluded in connection with the 
agreements on supplies for defense and security purpose. The foundation of planning for 
the budget of the Ministry of National Defense is the Law on Restructuring, Technical 
Modernization and Financing of the Polish Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland in 
the years 2001 – 2006.163 The fifth document that shapes the defense spending is the Act 
of Equipping the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland with Multi-Role Aircraft 
approved by the Sejm on 22 June 2001. 
This chapter, however, does not analyze all these documents. Rather, it provides a 
detailed description of rules imposed by the Law on Restructuring, Technical 
Modernization and Financing of the Polish Armed Forces in the years 2001 – 2006, and 
the Act of Equipping the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland with Multi-Role 
Aircraft. These two documents are the most important from the defense perspective. The 
rules imposed by these two documents shaped defense spending in Poland in the years 
2001-2003, and will have great impact on future decisions concerning the defense 
budgets in years to come. 
                                                 
162 Ibid., Chapter X, Art. 216-227. 
163 “The Programme of Restructuring and Modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces 2001 -2006.” 
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The last part of this chapter displays Poland’s expenditures in comparison with 
the other European NATO states in 1999 and 2004, giving an indication of the effect of 
recent laws. 
B. MODERNIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES IN POLAND SINCE 2001 
The Programme of Restructuring and Modernization of the Polish Armed Forces 
2001-2006 first emerged at the end of 2000. It was adopted by the Council of Ministers 
one month later, on 30 January 2001.164 As a consequence of a lesson learned from the 
experience of “Military 2012,”165 the government decided to guarantee financial support 
for its realization. This took the form of the Law on Restructuring, Technical 
Modernization and Financing of the Polish Armed Forces in the Years 2001-2006, 
adopted by the Sejm on 25 May 2001.166 
Responsibility for the realization of this program was assigned to the Minister of 
National Defense (art. 5.1), while the Council of Ministers was to supervise the course of 
its implementation (art. 5.4).167 Moreover, the Council of Ministers is obliged to present 
annual reports regarding the execution of this program to the Sejm.168 
The main purpose of this program is to bring one-third of the Polish armed forces 
up to NATO standards with regard to armaments, equipment, mobility and the ability to 
operate in complex missions beyond Polish territory by 2006.169 This is the equivalent of  
 
                                                 
164 Mroz, Marcin. “Program przebudowy i modernizacji technicznej Sil Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej 
w latach 2001-2006 w seietle informacji Rady Ministrow o jego realizacji w roku 2001.” Warszawa: Druk 
Sejmowy nr 100. 27 November 2001. p. 3. 
165 Program of Integration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Modernization of the 
Polish Armed Forces 1998-2012. This program was approved, but no funds for its implementation were 
assigned.  
166 Domisiewicz, Rafal. “Modernisation of the Armed Forces in Polish Foreign Policy.” 2002. 
Internet. Online. Available http://www.sprwymiedzynarodowe.pl/yearbook/2002/druk/domisiewicz.html  
(5 April 2004). 
167 Government of Poland. Law of 25 May 2001 on the Restructuring, Technical Modernization and 
Financing of the Polish Armed Forces in the Years 2001 -2006. 25 July 2001. 
168 Ibid., Art. 5(4). 
169 Ibid., Art 1(2). 
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11 combat units of the brigade-regiment type, 15 combat units of the battalion type, two 
units of the company type, five tactical air squadrons, 22 air-defense missile divisions, 
seven air bases, three radio-electronics units, 35 ships and two naval air squadrons.170  
Moreover, the Law on Restructuring, Technical Modernization and Financing of 
the Polish Armed Forces in the Years 2001-2006 imposed the withdrawal of “obsolete 
equipment” from the armed forces, as well as transfer of useless military properties to the 
Military Property Agency (Agencji Mienia Wojskowego).171 This agency is responsible 
for selling or the profitable utilization of the transferred properties. It is also obliged, by 
the same law, to assign no less than 93 percent of its profit to the plan for the 
development of the Polish armed forces.172  
Other sources of financing for the of modernization of the Polish armed forces are 
identified in article 6 of the Law of 25 May 2001.173 This provision states that required 
resources for implementation of the Programme of Restructuring and Modernization of 
the Polish Armed Forces will come from the State Budget, cash inflows generated from 
technical services provided by soldiers, income obtained from foreign armies leasing 
Polish ranges, as well as from privatization of the defense industry.174 Moreover, article 
6.2 allows use of donations given to the Ministry of National Defense for the purpose of 
implementing the program of modernization of the Polish armed forces. 
It should be noted that the Law on Restructuring, Technical Modernization and 
Financing of the Polish Armed Forces requires that no less than 1.95 percent of GDP be 
provided for defense spending by the State Budget, regardless of the income obtained  
                                                 
170 Komorowski, Bronislaw. “Reforming Poland’s military.” August 2001. Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0102-08.htm  (20 April 2004). 
171 Government of Poland. Law of 25 May 2001 on the Restructuring, Technical Modernization and 
Financing of the Polish Armed Forces in the Years 2001 -2006. 25 July 2001. Art 2 (8, 9). 
172 Ibid., Art 8. 
173 Law on the Restructuring, Technical Modernization and Financing of the Polish Armed Forces in 
the Years 2001 -2006. 
174 Cash inflows generated from technical services provided by soldiers, income obtained from foreign 
armies for leasing Polish ranges, and funds transferred from the Military Property Agency are considered 
“special funds.” Since 2003, a five percent tax was imposed on these funds in order to increase the State 
Budget revenue. 
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from other sources (identified above) in the years 2001-2006. In case of a recession, 
minimum levels of expenditures were established, from BPLN16.1 in 2002 to BPLN 20.2 
in 2006.175 (Table 3) 
The Law on Restructuring, Technical Modernization and Financing of the Polish 
Armed Forces also envisaged a reduction in the number of Polish troops, from 
approximately 180,000 in 2001 to 150,000 soldiers by the end of 2003, of whom 75,000 
will be professionals including no more than 25,000 officers.176 
To achieve the changes described above, the ratio of expenditures on arms and 
equipment to total defense spending was supposed to increase from around 8.3 percent in 
2000 to 23 percent in 2006.177 This forecast and the fact that defense budgets for the 
years 2001-2006 were established at the constant level of 1.95 of the GDP provided the 
fiscal basis for the long-term plans regarding purchases of weapons and equipment. 
According to these plans, the Polish armed forces planned the acquisition of, inter alia, 
120 wheeled armored personnel carriers, 78 tanks and six ships.178 
Moreover, almost at the same time, the multi-role fighter acquisition program was 
launched under a separate law. The Equipping the Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Poland with Multi-Role Aircraft Act was passed by the Sejm on 22 June 2001. According 
to its guidelines, the Polish Air Forces would lease or purchase 16 used multi-role aircraft 
by the end of 2003, and purchase 44 new fighter jets by the end of 2006.179 This law  
                                                 
175 This statement was withdrawn from article 7(1) of the Law on the Restructuring, Technical 
Modernization and Financing of the Polish Armed Forces in the Years 2001 -2006 by the Sejm on 30 
October 2002. 
176 Government of Poland. Law of 25 May 2001 on the Restructuring, Technical Modernization and 
Financing of the Polish Armed Forces in the Years 2001 -2006. 25 July 2001. Art 3 (1).  
177 Domisiewicz, Rafal. “Modernisation of the Armed Forces in Polish Foreign Policy.” 2002. 
Internet. Online. Available http://www.sprwymiedzynarodowe.pl/yearbook/2002/druk/domisiewicz.html  
(5 April 2004). 
178 Ibid. 
179 Government of Poland. Law of 22 June 2001 on Equipping the Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Poland with Multi-Role Aircraft. 22 June 2001. Art. 2(2). 
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guaranteed financing for this transaction in the years 2002-2010 from the state budget, on 
the condition that expenses would not exceed 0.5 percent of GDP. After that time, further 
financial obligations for new jets would come from defense expenditures.180  
The adoption of the Law on Restructuring, Technical Modernization and 
Financing of the Polish Armed Forces in the Years 2001-2006, followed by the 
Equipping the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland with Multi-Role Aircraft Act, for 
the first time opened up an opportunity to create a modern and strong military in Poland. 
However, three months later, on 23 October 2001, the program of armed forces 
modernization was undermined by the decision of the Council of Ministers to reduce 
defense spending by PLN 951.5 million (6.27 percent of the defense budget for 2001) due 
to economic difficulties in Poland.181 Moreover, the defense budget was further reduced 
later, and by the end of year, the military sector was under funded by PLN 1150.5 million 
(7.58 percent of the defense budget for 2001).182 The result of these reductions was that 
the implementation of the program of armed forces modernization was postponed.  
This fact led to a debate in the Sejm over the Programme of Restructuring and 
Modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces 2001 -2006. As a result of this debate, the law 
“was adjusted” to the altered situation. Specifically, on 30 October 2002, the Sejm passed 
amendments to the Law on Restructuring, Technical Modernization and Financing of the 
Polish Armed Forces in the Years 2001 -2006 in order to adapt it to the real financial 
capacity of the state.  
First, minimum levels for defense expenditures for the years 2002-2006, which 
had been established to secure defense spending in the case of a recession, were 
canceled.183 Secondly, the ratio of spending for expenditures on arms and equipment to 
total defense spending was reduced from 19 to 13.3 percent in 2003 and from 23 to 20 
                                                 
180 Ibid., Art. 3(1, 2). 
181 Government of Poland. Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland (Dzienik Ustaw). 23 October 
2001. Nr. 125. Poz. 1373. 
182 See Chapter IV. Table 5. 
183 Government of Poland. Law of 25 May 2001 on the Restructuring, Technical Modernization and 
Financing of the Polish Armed Forces in the Years 2001 -2006. 25 July 2001. Art 7(1).  See Chapter III. 
Table 4. 
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percent in 2006.184 Finally, article 7(2) states that the assigned 1.95 of GDP for defense 
includes not only spending within Part 29 “National Defense,”185 but also all 
expenditures related to the defense sector financed by other parts of the State Budget. 
These amendments took effect on 1 January 2003. 
The Defense Minister, Jerzy Szmajdzinski, responded by presenting a 
modernization programme for the Polish armed forces for the years 2003-2008 to the 
President and PM on 20 January 2002.186 This program is a continuation of the strategic 
assumptions included in the plan for the years 2001-2006. 
That is why the implementation of the program of the development of the Polish 
armed forces in the year 2001-2006 was significantly slowed down. However, the 
Minister of National Defense has been able to realize some elements of the six-year plan.  
Firstly, 620 units were disbanded; 155 new units were constituted; 52 garrisons 
were closed; and about 40 percent of the military infrastructure has been given to the 
Military Property Agency for selling or profitable utilization.187 Secondly, the manpower 
of the Polish armed forces has been reduced, numbering 147,841 (28,234 officers) by 30 
April 2004.188 Thirdly, some units that have achieved NATO standards, have been made 
available to the NATO Response Force, including two light battalions, one special 
operation company, one engineering company and one NBC company.189 Table 6 
displays the status of the Polish armed forces regarding NATO standards at the end of 
2003. 
                                                 
184 Ibid., Art. 7(3). 
185 See Chapter IV. Figure 5. 
186 Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Washington, D.C. “Army Modernisation Programme to Be 
Presented to President and PM.” Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.polandembassy.org/News/Biuletyny_news/p2003-01-20.htm  (20 May 2004). 
187 Defense and Security Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defense Capabilities. “16-19 June 
2003 Visit to Poland and Lithuania.” Internet. Online. Available http://www.nato-
pa.int/default.asp?TAB=396  (15 February 2004). 
188 Ministry of National Defense. “Kadry.” Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.wp.mil.pl/start.php?page=1010701000   (15 May 2004). 
189 Defense and Security Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defense Capabilities. “16-19 June 
2003 Visit to Poland and Lithuania.” Internet. Online. Available http://www.nato-
pa.int/default.asp?TAB=396  (15 February 2004). 
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Type  Required 
by 2006 
Status 
in 2003      
Description 
Combat units of the brigade-regiment 11 2 10th Armored Cavalry Brigade, 10th Logistical Brigade 
Combat units of the battalion 15 2 16th Battalion, 18th Airborne Battalion 
Units of the company 2 -  
Tactical air squadrons 5 3 1st Tactical Air Squadron, 7th Tactical Air Squadron,             
40th Tactical Air Squadron 
Air-defense missile divisions 22 1 4th Anti-aircraft Regiment 
Air bases 7 -  
Radio-electronics units 3 -  
Naval air squadrons 2 -  
Ships  35 8 The submarine ORP "Orzel," the corvette ORP "Kaszub," 
3 rocket-carriers of the 3rd Flotilla, a mine-transporter of 
the 8th Flotilla, the minesweeper ORP "Mewa," and the 
salvage ship ORP "Piast"   
 
Table 6. Polish Military Units Within NATO, 2003190 
 
Moreover, on 28 August 2001, the Ministry of National Defense signed a contract 
to supply eight Spanish EADS/CASA medium-range transport aircraft to the Polish Air 
Force over the years 2003-2005.191 Poland is also in the process of acquiring 
approximately 700 new armored personnel carriers, 48 F-16 fighter aircraft,192 and eight 
C-130 transport aircraft.193 
C. POLAND’S BUDGET EXPENDITURES IN COMPARISON WITH THE 
OTHER EUROPEAN STATES OF NATO 
This section provides an overview of defense spending by European members of 
NATO. This information is provided to allow a comparison of Poland’s willingness to  
                                                 
190 Ministry of National Defense. “Poland in NATO.” Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.wp.mil.pl/start/php?page=1010500001  (15 May 2004). 
191 Domisiewicz, Rafal. “Modernisation of the Armed Forces in Polish Foreign Policy.” 2002. 
Internet. Online. Available http://www.sprwymiedzynarodowe.pl/yearbook/2002/druk/domisiewicz.html  
(5 April 2004). 
192 The acquisition of F-16 is under the program of The Equipping the Armed Forces of the Republic 
of Poland with Multi-Role Aircraft Act. 
193 Defense and Security Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defense Capabilities. “16-19 June 
2003 Visit to Poland and Lithuania.” Internet. Online. Available http://www.nato-
pa.int/default.asp?TAB=396  (15 February 2004). 
 61
commit resources to the common defense of other NATO members. Firstly, defense 
spending as a percentage of the GDP over the years 1999 and 2002 is discussed, followed 
by an analysis of defense expenditures per capita in 2004.  
Defense spending as a percentage of the GDP measures the portion of a country’s 
overall economy that is devoted to defense. It indicates the burden that defense places on 
the economy of each country, automatically adjusting for differences in national 
income.194 Therefore, it is “the most comprehensive indicator of defense effort (defense 
spending) and the most comprehensive indicator of ability to contribute (GDP).”195 
Figure 7 indicates these numbers for selected European members of NATO in the years 
1999 and 2002. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP in the Years 1999 and 2002196 
                                                 
194 United States. Congressional Budget Office Paper. NATO Burdensharing After Enlargement. 
August 2001. p. 2. 
195 “Allied Contributions to the Common Defense 2003.” Internet. Online. Available 
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Figure 8.   Defense Spending in Poland as a Percentage of GDP197 
 
Taking a closer look at the defense spending expressed as a share of the GDP in 
Poland, it is noticed that the burden that defense placed on the economy fell from 2.25 
percent in 1991 to 1.95 percent in 2003.198 (Figure 8) 
NATO requires that members not only raise defense spending to 2.2 percent of 
the GDP but also to concentrate financial resources on investment rather than manpower 
and maintenance.199 In spite of fact that defense spending in Poland fell as a percentage 
of GDP, the ratio of expenditures on arms and equipment to total defense spending 
increased from less than 10 percent in 2001 to 13.3 percent in 2003.200 Furthermore, 
spending on equipment for the armed forces in 2004 probably will exceed PLN 2.9 
billion (16.2 percent), followed by a further increase to 20 percent in 2006.201 
                                                 
197 Ministry of National Defense. The Budget Department. The Basic Information on The MoND 
Budget for 2003. Warszawa: Departament Budzetowy MON, Departament Wychowania i Promocji 
Obronosci MON. 2003, p. 9. 
198 Ibid. 
199 “NATO Integration a Long-Term Task: Eastern Europe: Defense Reforms.” Proquest. Online. 
Available http://proquest.uni.com/pqdweb?index=7&did=000000568016991&SrchMode  (1 April 2004). 
200 Ministry of National Defense. The Budget Department. “Podstawowe Informacje o budzecie MON 
na rok 2004.” Internet. Online. Available http://www.mil.pl  (20 May 2004). 
201 Ibid. 
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Per capita defense spending is another measurement of a county’s willingness to 
commit resources to the common defense. It indicates how much a country devotes to 
defense relative to the size of its population. Figure 9 displays Poland’s budget 
expenditures in comparison with the other European NATO states for 2004. 
 
  
Figure 9.   Poland’s Per Capita Defense Expenditures in Comparison with Other 
European States of NATO in 2004 (constant 1995 prices)202 
 
Before analyzing the data provided by the Figure 9, it must be noted that the 
purchasing power of the Polish zloty (PLN) has significantly changed since 1995. After 
taking these changes into consideration, Polish defense spending per capita would 
translate into a higher figure, amounting to approximately 170 US dollars.203 
Nevertheless, even this figure is not comparable to the NATO average. 
However, other measurements of a country’s contribution to European security 
may be relevant, e.g., contribution to rapid reaction forces designed for “out-of-area” 
missions, participation in peacekeeping missions or in observer missions. Measured by 
these standards, Poland is an active contributor. For example, in 2002, 1,575 Polish 
military and civilian personnel were deployed in 15 peacekeeping operations and  




















observation missions. In 2004, Poland is participating in UNDOF (Syria), UNIFIL 
(Libya), SFOR (Bosnia), KFOR (Kosovo), “Enduring Freedom” (Afghanistan), and “Iraq 
Freedom” (Iraq), with a total of 4,019 people involved.204 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Law on Restructuring, Technical Modernization and Financing of the Polish 
Armed Forces in the Years 2001-2006 and the Equipping the Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Poland with Multi-Role Aircraft aim for achievement of full interoperability 
with NATO by one-third of the Polish armed forces. These laws provided the opportunity 
to create a modern and strong military in Poland for the first time since the collapse of 
communism in 1989. Once fully implemented, they will provide a foundation for Polish 
cooperation with allied forces both within the boundaries of Poland and beyond. 
To conclude, the efforts that Poland made in order to improve the state of the 
Polish armed forces as well as the contribution of these forces to peacekeeping and 
military action indicate that Poland is determined to be not a security consumer but a 
security provider. As noted by the NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
during his visit to Poland on 4 March 2004,  
Five years ago, when Poland became a member of NATO, the Polish 
Foreign Minister promised that Poland would be a ‘good and credible ally, 
for good and bad weather’. In the time that has passed since then, Poland 
has kept its promise. 
                                                 
204 Ministry of National Defense. “Misje Pokojowe WP.” Internet. Online. Available 
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VI.  SUMMARY 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters, this thesis addressed the issue of the legal and 
institutional evolution of the defense budget process in post-communist Poland. It 
identified the changes to the basic rules governing the budget process and displayed how 
these changes impacted the Polish Parliament. Furthermore, it analyzed the distribution 
of power among the different actors in the budget cycle, and provided an overview of 
Poland’s defense spending in comparison with the other European states of NATO.  
This chapter briefly summarizes what was discussed in the previous chapters and 
provides the author’s observations, conclusions and recommendations for further 
research.  
B. OBSERVATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
Fifteen years of the democratic transformation in Poland provides a rich overview 
of the extremely difficult and historically unprecedented process of transforming a 
totalitarian system into a modern democracy. In 2004, Poland is perceived as a country 
that has made a successful transition from a centrally planned to a free-market economy 
and a consolidated democracy.  
Under Poland’s communist regimes, defense policy was the exclusive domain of 
the military, closely controlled by the Main Political Administration. Procedures for the 
planning and realization of expenditures for the purposes of defense were politically 
oriented. Defense budgets were driven by task requirements and did not reflect the 
economic situation. After the collapse of communism in Poland, civilian control over the 
Polish armed forces and the defense budget became crucial issues associated with the 
transition to a democracy and a free market. These issues became even more obvious 
when Poland decided to base its new security policy on integration with NATO in the 
early 1990. Since then, the major changes impacting the process of governmental 
budgeting in Poland have been subordinated to this policy.  
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In 1994, Poland joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP). At first, the Polish armed 
forces, after five years of the gradual degradation of military capabilities, were not 
capable of fulfilling the requirements of the PfP. This led to the first parliamentary debate 
over national defense. The result of this debate was the adoption of a resolution that made 
a recommendation for setting defense spending at 3 percent of the GDP by the end of 
1997. 
In July 1997, Poland was invited to join NATO.  Two months later, in September 
1997, the Government adopted the “Programme for Integration with the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and Modernization of the Polish Armed Forces 1998-2012.” 
After Poland’s accession to NATO in 1999, the priority of army modernization 
was made clear as never before. In December 2000, the Government adopted the 
“Programme of Restructuring and Technical Modernization of the Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Poland 2001-2006,” legislation aimed at fulfilling Alliance objectives. 
Moreover, the Government decided to guarantee stable defense spending in the form of a 
law. The “Law on Restructuring, Technical Modernization and Financing of the Polish 
Armed Forces in the Years 2001-2006” was passed by the Sejm on 25 May 2001. A 
separate parliamentary law, the “Equipping the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland 
with Multi-Role Aircraft Act” was passed by the Sejm on 22 June 2001 to provide 
funding for a major NATO-related weapons system. 
These events provide distinct evidence that major changes impacting the process 
of governmental budgeting for defense in Poland after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact 
were generated by the PfP and NATO obligations.  
Another important factor that shaped defense budgets in the course of the Polish 
transition from a centrally planned to a free-market economy and a consolidated 
democracy was a changing political environment. The period between 1989 and 2004 has 
been characterized by frequent changes in government and instability within political 
parties. The average duration of the ten governments of the Third Republic of Poland 
(September 1989- May 2004) has been 16 months. It must be noted, however, that the 
later ones ruled longer than their predecessors. The political longevity of the government 
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increased with the introduction of the Electoral Law of 1993. This law stabilized the 
political system by applying the d’Hondt electoral method. Additionally, the Constitution 
of 1997 eliminated a situation where two state organs claimed to have similar 
competencies. Within this turbulent political environment, it has been extremely difficult 
to reach consensus in approving budgets. 
In 2004, the process of budgeting for defense in Poland is shaped by legal acts 
and regulations derived from five documents. The first is the Constitution of 1997. This 
Constitution, in conjunction with the Public Finance Act of 1998, precisely defines the 
timetable and the scope of the defense budget, and also identifies the main actors in the 
budget process. The Offset Bill of 1999 imposes “compensation agreements,” to be 
concluded in connection with contracts for supplies for the Polish military. The Law on 
Restructuring, Technical Modernization and Financing of the Polish Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Poland in the years 2001-2006 provides a detailed  foundation for planning 
the budget of the Ministry of National Defense, while the Act of Equipping the Armed 
Forces of the Republic of Poland with Multi-Role Aircraft opened a gate for the 
acquisition of modern supersonic aircraft.  
These legal documents have created a basic platform for defense planning and 
programming for the next few years. However, it should be noted that this platform is 
relatively new and highly subordinated to the economic situation in Poland. This 
limitation is best illustrated by the situation that took place in 2001, when only three 
months after the adoption of the Law on Restructuring, Technical Modernization and 
Financing of the Polish Armed Forces in the years 2001-2006, realization of this plan was 
undermined by the decision of the Council of Ministers to reduce defense spending by 
PLN 951.5 million due to economic difficulties in Poland. 
 Moreover, the Law on Restructuring, Technical Modernization and Financing of 
the Polish Armed Forces in the years 2001-2006 and the Act of Equipping the Armed 
Forces with Multi-Role Aircraft have a temporary character. The process of defense 
budgeting in Poland has not reached its ultimate shape, and we should expect changes in 
the process of financing the defense sector.  
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Another author’s observation is that legislative engagement throughout the 
defense budget cycle is rather minor. Specifically, the Polish budgeting cycle is separated 
into four different stages: drafting, legislating, execution, and audit. The drafting and 
execution stages are purely in the hands of the executive, whereas legislating and audit 
stages are supervised by the legislature. However, the evidence is that the Sejm and the 
Senat in Poland have not exercised any significant influence on the defense budgets. 
Between 1996 and 2003, the Parliament “slightly” amended governmental proposals for 
defense spending only twice. In 2001, the Sejm changed the allocation of funds within 
the Defense Budget, and in 2003 it decreased the defense budget by PLN5.7 million or 
0.04 percent.  
The lack of activity by the legislature in the defense field, however, is caused not 
by the fact that the government has prepared and presented to them the best possible 
defense budgets. Rather, it is the result of poor legislative oversight of defense issues and 
minimal transparency in the course of shaping defense budgets within the MoND and the 
government. The defense budget has been changed every year since 1996, but only once, 
in 2003, was the Parliament the source of these changes.  
Moreover, having analyzed the process of transformation of the Polish armed 
forces - their needs, requirements and obligations - it can be concluded that the 
Parliament does not perceive “army business” as a priority. For instance, in 2001, the 
execution of the defense budget was PLN 1150.5 million less than the amount depicted in 
the Budget Act for that year. The result of this reduction was that the program of armed 
forces modernization was postponed. The Sejm decided to adjust the law to the altered 
situation. Specifically, the Sejm passed amendments to the Law on Restructuring, 
Technical Modernization and Financing of the Polish Armed Forces in the years 2001-
2006. As a result, the minimum levels for defense expenditures for the years 2002-2006 
that had been established to provide the fiscal basis for long-term plans regarding the 
purchases of weapons and equipment were cancelled.  
Another observation concerns the inconsistency in available data regarding the 
defense spending allocations and their execution. For example, the data published in the 
official guide “Basic information on the MoND Budget for 2003” issued by the Budget 
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Department and the Department of Education and Promotion of Defense are inconsistent 
with data provided by the Ministry of Finance. This inconsistency caused enormous 
problems in the course of writing this paper.  
Moreover, public availability of fiscal information concerning defense spending 
in Poland is significantly restricted. For instance, it is much easer to find data regarding 
the defense sector on international web sites, gathered and analyzed by foreign 
institutions and organization, than on Polish sites. The official web page of the Ministry 
of National Defense provides only limited data, much less than is needed for conducting 
serious research. Furthermore, the data provided on the MoND’s page is limited to the 
few last years. The author did not find data regarding defense spending before 2000 on 
any official government sites. 
This thesis suggests many possibilities for further studies. These would include a 
comparison of the Polish defense budget cycle with those in Hungary and the Czech 
Republic (countries that joined NATO with Poland in 1999). Another possibility for 
further study might be a detailed description of activities within the National Defense 
Committee and its influence on the Sejm’s decisions in Poland. Finally, further studies 
could evaluate the implementation and realization of the Law on Restructuring, Technical 
Modernization and Financing of the Polish Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland in 
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APPENDIX.  POLAND’S PROCUREMENT PLANS ACCORDING 
TO THE “PROGRAMME FOR INTEGRATION WITH THE NORTH 
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND MODERNIZATION 
OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES 1998-2012” 205 
 
CATEGORY COST SPECIFICS 
Detection and radio 
electronic combat systems 
$1.35 billion • More than 150 radar systems  
• About 20 reconnaissance aircraft 
Command and 
communication systems 
$1.52 billion • Almost 20,000 field combat broadcast systems  
• More than 300 digital radio relays  
• More than 200 integrated communication and 
command systems  
Individual equipment for 
soldiers 
$.47 billion • Approximately 85,000 pistols and machine guns 
with munitions (including Beryl, 5.56 mm 
machine guns)  
• More than 500 mortars with ammunition  
• More than 50,000 bullet-proof helmets and vests 
• About 30,000 sets of protective gear  
Air defence equipment and 
combat resources 
$.88 billion • About 700 artillery and close range missile units 
(Grom)  
• About 100 self-propelled missile-artillery units 
(Loara)  
• Modernisation of missile units (Neva, Volchov) 
• Potential for purchasing long range missile 
systems, such as Patriot  
Anti-tank equipment and 
combat resources 
$.23 billion • About 215 sets of guided anti-tank missiles  
• About 50 self-propelled mine laying systems  
Multipurpose and attack 
helicopters 
$1.7 billion • About 100 Huzar attack helicopters  
• 3,600 guided anti-tank missiles for helicopters  
• More than 100 Sokol and Anaconda helicopters 
                                                 
205 Dragsdahl, Jorgen. “NATO Resists Pressures to Militarise Central Europe.” July 1998. Internet. 
Online. Available http://basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP28.htm  (2 April 2004). 
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CATEGORY COST SPECIFICS 
Aviation equipment $1.23 billion • Modernization of MiG-29 and Su-22 aircraft  
• Purchase of 50-60 transport and fighter trainer 
aircraft (AN-28, Orlik, Iryda)  
• Purchase of modern combat aviation equipment 






• More than 100 fighter aircraft (up to $44 million 
per unit)  
• Ground system for securing aircraft use  
Ground artillery equipment 
and resources 
$.52 billion • 155 mm self-propelled howitzer guns  
• About 15 mortar batteries with fire control 
systems  
• Modernization of rocket artillery  
• Self-guided artillery and rocket ammunition  
Armoured personnel and 
infantry combat vehicles 
$1.05 billion • Modernization of tanks and infantry combat 
vehicles (includes upgrades of T-72M1)  
• More than 300 Armored wheel transports  
• New generation tanks (PT-91 Twardy)  
Ships - marine equipment $.73 billion • More than 10 new combat ships (including 7 
Kaszub corvettes, 3 submarines)  
• Modernization of several ships  
Various equipment $1.60 billion • Ammunition, combat equipment, battlefield 
simulators  
• Terrain vehicles  
• New generation trucks  
• Logistics equipment  
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